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This thesis explores the relationship between the mediation led by Kofi Annan in 2008 in 
Kenya, in the middle of the post-election violence that took place after the presidential 
elections, and the performance of the subsequent power sharing agreement. This study does so 
by focusing on five variables, as defined by Alexandre Raffoul, that are particularly relevant 
in understanding barriers to elite cooperation in power sharing settlements. By analysing 
problems relating to the balance of power, inside and outside spoilers, identity and political 
accountability problems and credible commitment problems, barriers to a successful power 
sharing agreement can be examined. To analyse how the mediation affected power sharing, 
five variables concerning the mediation are examined, namely the use of leverage, horizontal 
and vertical inclusivity, relationship-building and the content of the agreement. These five 
variables are combined one-on-one with the power sharing analysis to determine how 
mediation affects the performance of power sharing. This study argues that the type of 
mediation shapes the performance of power sharing, and that barriers to elite cooperation in 
the power sharing period can be addressed in the mediation phase of conflict to prevent future 
tensions. This knowledge can contribute to improving mediation efforts and make power 
sharing a more viable undertaking. By regarding mediation as an integral process to 
peacebuilding and to change mediation designs when applicable, conflict can be addressed in 
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“We have had trouble here before, but never anything this bad… When it comes to night-time, 
everybody is in a state of panic,” is how one inhabitant of Rift Valley expressed the horror of 
the crisis that engulfed Kenya in the aftermath of the contested 2007 elections.2 On December 
27th 2007, after months of aggressive and divisive campaigning, Kenyans went to the polls to 
vote for a new parliament and president. The presidential poll featured the incumbent President 
Mwai Kibaki of the Party of National Unity (PNU) against Raila Odinga of the Orange 
Democratic Movement (ODM).3 The elections of December 2007 were the fourth presidential 
elections in Kenya since the introduction of a multiparty system in Kenya in the beginning of 
the 1990s. The voting day was peaceful, characterized by a huge voter turnout.4 However, 
tensions started arising when the vote counting began, as there seemed to be big inconsistencies 
in the voting process.5 Violence engulfed the country when the Electoral Commission of Kenya 
(ECK) declared incumbent President Kibaki the winner of the election in the midst of heated 
debate over voting discrepancies. He was immediately sworn in in a hastily organized 
ceremony 45 minutes later, while international observers had noted discrepancies in the 
elections and the opposition under the leadership of Raila Odinga of the ODM declared that 
the elections were ‘rigged’.6 
 
The violence quickly spread throughout the country taking on the form of ethnic dimensions. 
Kibaki, who was an ethnic Kikuyu 7, could count on the support from his fellow Kikuyu’s and 
related groups such as the Embu and the Meru in Central Kenya. Raila Odinga had the support 
of his Luo community in addition to the Luyha, Kalenjin and Mijikenda groups. What initially 
started as peaceful protests in ODM strongholds quickly escalated when police responded with 
 
2 Xan Rice, “Kenya at Breaking Point: Dozens Killed as Mob Sets Fire to Church”, The Guardian, 2 January 2008, 
Accessed January 10, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/jan/02/kenya.topstories3. 
3 Leon Schreiber, “Making Power Sharing Work: Kenya’s Grand Coalition Cabinet, 2008-2013”, Global 
Challenges (2016): 2. 
4 Gilbert M. Khadiagala, “Forty Days and Nights of Peacemaking in Kenya”, Journal of African Elections 7:2 
(2008): 7. 
5 Peter Kagwanja and Roger Southall, “Introduction: Kenya – A Democracy in Retreat?”, Journal of 
Contemporary African Studies 27:3 (2009): 260.  
6 Ibid, pp 263.  
7 Kenya is a country that consists of ethnic minorities; the biggest community are the Kikuyu, who are about 22% 
of the Kenyan population and live mostly in Central and Eastern Kenya. The next biggest group are the Luhya 
(14%), who inhabit the western provinces. The Luo (13%) mostly live in Nyanza, whereas the Kalenjin (12%) are 
central to the Rift Valley. The Meru and Embu groups (6%) live around the Mount Kenya area. The Mijikenda are 
a small community from the coastal region. 
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excessive force.8 ODM supporters started attacking PNU supporters, which were mostly 
Kikuyus, and drove them out of their homes and destroyed their properties.9 Notorious gangs 
such as the Mungiki and the Taliban, which are known to have strong ties to influential 
politicians,10 came out of their sleeper cells11 and took advantage of the situation, driving tens 
of thousands out of the slums. Ethnic militias initiated the killing of Kikuyus in a pursue of an 
ethnic cleansing in the Rift Valley. The Kikuyu community hit back with retaliatory attacks on 
ODM supporters and innocent Luo and Kalenjin populations. While the international 
community watched in horror, both the PNU and the ODM tried to capitalize on the violence 
to grab power.12 
 
International and domestic pressure eventually brought both parties to the negotiation table 
where the two parties agreed to a mediation under the leadership of the African Union’s Panel 
of Eminent African Personalities. The Panel, headed by Kofi Annan, consisted of former 
President of Tanzania Benjamin Mkapa and former First Lady of Mozambique, Graça Machel. 
After forty-two days of mediation and with incredible international support, Kibaki and Odinga 
finally agreed to sharing power in a Grand Coalition Government. They also complied to alter 
the Constitution and signed the National Accord and Reconciliation Act, which ended the 
violence.13 A power sharing cabinet was created that remained functional until the elections in 
2013.  
 
The National Accord demanded a cabinet that consisted of an equal number of members of 
both the PNU and the ODM in an effort to solve the political impasse between the two parties. 
This cabinet was given an extensive list of tasks to achieve in the next few years to ensure 
reforms were made and the country would not slide back into violence in the elections to 
come.14 Although the coalition government appeared to be relatively functional, few of the 
 
8 Jacqueline Klopp and Prisca Kamungi, “Violence and Elections: Will Kenya Collapse?”, World Policy Journal 
24:4 (2008): 12. 
9 Karuti Kanyinga, “Stopping a Conflagration: The Response of Kenyan Civil Society to the Post-2007 Election 
Violence”, Politikon 38:1 (2011): 92. 
10 H. Nanjala Nyabola, “The Legal Challenge of Civil Militia Groups in Kenya”, African Security Studies 18:3 
(2009): 95. 
11 In periods outside of election times, Kenya’s militias and gangs make their living by providing ‘security’ to 
people in mostly urban slums, often crossing the the borders of legality and illegality (Bodil Folke Frederiksen, 
1083). 
12 Klopp and Kamungi, “Violence”, pp 12-13. 
13 Kanyinga, “Stopping a Conflagration”, pp 86. 
14 Monica Juma, ““African Mediation of the Kenyan Post-2007 Election Crisis”, Journal of Contemporary African 
Studies 27:3 (2009): 423. 
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goals set by the Accord were actually achieved. One of the main reasons for this was the 
continuous abuse of power by the ruling group behind a screen of functionality. Anti-reform 
alliances were formed through which politicians effectively hindered reforms and attempts to 
end the culture of impunity.15 This was in line with the manner politics has been in Kenya since 
independence. As a result, little long-term change was achieved through the signing of the 
National Accord. 
 
Kofi Annan’s mediation was widely praised as an example of international intervention and 
the diplomatic practice of the Responsibility 2 Protect16. Kenya was yet again viewed as an 
island of stability in a volatile region by the international community. However, few of the 
provisions made by the National Accord were actually implemented and against the 
government’s promises, reforms were barely realized. Therefore, the question arises whether 
the power sharing period truly achieved its goals as determined by the mediation. To analyse 
this, this dissertation closely examines the 2008 mediation to determine its consequences on 
the performance of power sharing in Kenya. 
 
1.2. Research question and objectives 
This thesis aims to analyse the power sharing period in Kenya by answering the research 
question “How did the Annan-led mediation in 2008 affect the long-term performance of power 
sharing in Kenya?”. The research question will be answered by looking at five different 
variables of power sharing as established by peacebuilding scholar Alexandre Raffoul. Raffoul 
has developed a framework that exists of five different variables which analyze power sharing 
by looking at problems that hinder post-agreement cooperation between parties. These 
variables are problems relating to the balance of power, inside and outside spoilers, identity 
and political accountability problems and credible commitment problems. This study follows 
Raffoul’s work and combines research into power sharing with mediation, by analyzing 
mediation through five other variables, namely the use of leverage, horizontal and vertical 
inclusivity, relationship building and the content of the agreement. By applying the five 
variables on power sharing to the five variables concerning mediation one-on-one, the 
 
15 Nic Cheeseman and Blessing-Miles Tendi, “Power Sharing in Comparative Perspective: The Dynamics of 
‘Unity’ Government in Kenya and Zimbabwe”, The Journal of Modern African Studies 48:2 (2010): 207.  
16 The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is a global commitment endorsed by all member states of the UN in 2005 
to prevent and react to cases of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity (Crossley 
193). 
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mediation in Kenya can be examined to determine its consequences on power sharing. This 
theoretical framework was selected because it is the only scholarly research that combines the 
performance of power sharing with the preceding mediation, even though mediation creates 
the power sharing agreements that are crucial to the power sharing period. Therefore, this thesis 
focuses on the period of power sharing in Kenya, from 2008 to 2013, to establish how the 
power sharing was affected by the mediation and to answer the research question. 
 
1.3. Rationale 
This research is valuable as mediation is often employed to address both intra- and interstate 
conflict in Africa, whereby international mediators regularly suggest power sharing as a means 
of conflict resolution. Since the 1990s, nearly all mediated settlements in Africa have included 
power sharing elements in many countries, including Angola, Comoros Islands, Burundi, 
Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Djibouti, Liberia, Kenya, Mali, Senegal, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan and Zimbabwe.17 
Despite its increasing popularity, power sharing can be a risky approach to conflict 
transformation, as while power sharing has proven effective in the short term, in the long term 
it tends to create problems that hinder peacebuilding and reconciliation.18 This thesis looks at 
the type of mediation to understand the performance of the power sharing. Although the 
mediation brought an end to the violence in Kenya, in the long-term, the power sharing period 
was not as successful as hoped. Therefore, it is important to analyze the start of the 
peacebuilding process to see its effects on the performance of power sharing, as the type of 
mediation can greatly influence the period following the signing of the agreement. This is also 
this dissertation’s contribution to the literature: not many scholars have examined power 
sharing in light of the preceding mediation process, even though researchers such as Lanz and 
Siegfried suggest a link between the design of the mediation and the subsequent power sharing 
settlement.19 This is an angle that has not yet been sufficiently explored in the literature, and 
that is the gap this dissertation aims to fill. This study does not intend to criticize Kofi Annan 
personally as the mediator, but rather hopes to inquire what could have been done differently 
in the mediating process to invoke long-term change. Therefore, this dissertation contributes 
to the scholarly understanding of power sharing in general and Kenya in particular. 
 
17 Cheeseman and Tendi, “Unity Government”, pp 204. 
18 Allison McCulloch and Joanne McEvoy, “The International Mediation of Power Sharing Settlements”, 
Cooperation and Conflict 53:4 (2018): 468. 
19 David Lanz and Matthias Siegfried, Mediation Process Matrix (Bern: Swisspeace, 2012). 
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1.4. Clarifying concepts 
1.4.1. Power sharing 
This dissertation examines the practice of power sharing. Power sharing has come to comprise 
a wide range of arrangements varying across dimensions. It can refer to power shared between 
elites, either politically, economically, military or territorially.20 This thesis concentrates on 
political power sharing, which can be understood as “mechanisms for joint involvement of key 
protagonists of conflict in political institutions”.21 For the Kenyan case, this meant a grand 
coalition that incorporated both the ODM and the PNU equally. This thesis will focus 
specifically on the timeframe from April 2008 until April 2013 to research the performance of 
the power sharing agreement. 
 
1.4.2. Mediation 
This work adopts the widely accepted definition suggested by Bercovitch and Houston, which 
describes mediation as “a reactive process of conflict management whereby parties seek the 
assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an individual, group, or organization to change 
their behavior, settle their conflict, or resolve their problem without resorting to physical force 
or invoking the authority of the law”.22 This definition is broad enough to analyze different 
aspects of the mediation, such as the incentives for the mediator to intervene, and the social 
context the mediation takes place in.  
 
1.5. Overview of the structure 
This dissertation starts with an explanation of the research design, in which the research 
strategy will be explained. This thesis uses a case study approach and the research design 
section will elaborate on the specifics of this methodology. After the research design, a 
literature review follows. The literature review looks into the literature written on power 
sharing in Kenya, focusing on elite politics, interethnic power sharing, justice reforms and 
constitutional provisions and establishes the gap in the literature. The next chapter is the 
theoretical framework, which explains the framework designed by Alexandre Raffoul that this 
 
20 Caroline Hartzell and Matthew Hoddie, “Institutionalizing Peace: Power Sharing and Post-Civil War Conflict 
Management”, American Journal of Political Science 47:2 (2003): 320. 
21 Christine Bell, Political Power Sharing and Inclusion: Peace and Transition Processes, PA-X Report (Edinburgh: 
University of Edinburgh, 2018): 9. 
22 Jacob Bercovitch and Allison Houston, “The Study of International Mediation: Theoretical Issues and 
Empirical Evidence” in Resolving International Conflicts: The Theory and Practice of International Mediation, 
ed. Jacob Bercovitch (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996): 13. 
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dissertation follows. The framework consists of five variables that look at power sharing. 
Following Raffoul’s research, this dissertation looks at how the mediation of Kofi Annan in 
2008 affected power sharing in Kenya. Therefore, five more variables are described that 
analyze the mediation that correspond one on one with the variables regarding power sharing. 
This is all explained in the theoretical framework chapter. After this chapter, a background 
chapter narrates the course of the post-election violence to provide a better understanding of 
the environment the mediation took place in. The causes of violence are also explained further. 
After the background chapter, the mediation is introduced. The chapter notes how the 
mediation originated, who was involved and what the goals were. The chapter further applies 
the five variables as developed by Raffoul to analyze the mediation further. The last chapter 
elaborates on power sharing in Kenya by following the five variables regarding power sharing, 
linking power sharing to mediation. After this chapter the conclusion summarizes the findings 
and provides a short analysis, after which suggestions for future research are mentioned. 
 
1.6. Research design 
The purpose of this subchapter is to present the methodology for this study in order to achieve 
the research aims and objectives. This chapter is divided into different sections. This chapter 
first reiterates the research question again, after which the following section explains the 
terminology used in this thesis. Then, the research approach and strategy are outlined. 
Thereafter, the methods of data collection and analysis will be introduced. Lastly, the 
limitations of the research methodology are explained. 
 
1.6.1. Research strategy 
In line with the research question, an interpretive case study approach has been adopted to 
provide an in-depth understanding of the multi-faceted topics involved in the research context. 
As a definition, Yin states it efficiently: “A case study is an empirical inquiry that: investigates 
a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are 
used”.23 The underlying presumption of interpretive case studies is that research needs to be 
carried out in an in-depth and holistic manner in order to place the phenomena in the 
 
23 R. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods (Newbury Park: Sage Publishing, 1989): 23. 
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appropriate context.24 Case studies have been used by researchers for many years across 
different disciplines, mainly the social sciences, to analyze present-day concrete situations.25 
Bensabat et al point out that case studies are relevant when focusing on process and context 
questions that look at a long process rather than a specific point in time; case studies assist in 
tracing links in longer periods of time.26 Runeson and Höst note that case studies are used for 
phenomena that cannot be studied in isolation. In addition, case studies are incredibly useful in 
providing a deeper understanding of the phenomena under analysis. Lijphart praises the case 
study method as one that allows for intensive examination even when the researcher’s 
resources are limited. He also mentions that interpretive case studies make explicit use of 
existing theories; by applying general theory to a specific case a deeper understanding of the 
case can be achieved.27 By using a critical interpretive case study approach, the researcher 
investigates various dimensions to paint a complex, holistic picture out of detailed narrative 
data.28 The case study method has often been criticized for being “less valuable” than general 
and controlled empirical studies, impossible to generalize from, and carried out by biased 
researchers.29 However, these misconceptions can be met by recognizing that knowledge is 
more than statistical significance and by employing appropriate research methodology 
practices.30  
 
As mediation in post-election crises and their long-term effects have been severely 
understudied, an interpretive case study will assist considerably to understand the complex 
facets of the Kenyan crisis. Case studies produce the context-dependent knowledge that is 
necessary for humans to develop from rule-based beginners to experts.31 The case study method 
was selected for this study as it tends to give the researcher the freedom to focus on the case 
itself, rather than a theoretical model which would evolve around the model itself rather than 
the case. 
 
24 Wenshin Chen and David Bennett, “Gaining Social Values of Wireless Technology: An Interpretive Case Study 
in the Healthcare Institutional Context”, International Journal of Information Management 33:5 (2013): 803. 
25 Fahad Alnaim, “The Case Study Method: Critical Reflection”, Global Journal of Human-Social Science 15:7 
(2015): 29. 
26 Izaak Bensabat, David Goldstein and Melissa Mead, “The Case Research Strategy in Studies of Information 
Systems”, MIS Quarterly 11:3 (1987): 369. 
27 Arend Lijphart, “Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method”, The American Political Science Review 
65:3 (1971): 692.  
28 Bettie Ray Butler, Heather Coffey and Jemimah Lee Young, “Justice-Oriented Teaching Dispositions in Urban 
Education: A Critical Interpretive Case Study”, Urban Education 0 (2018): 11. 
29 Bent Flyvbjerg, “Five Misunderstandings about Case Study Research”, Qualitative Inquiry 12:2 (2006): 221. 
30 Ibid, pp 224. 
31 Ibid, pp 221. 
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1.6.2. Data collection 
According to Yin, a case study is a thorough methodology which incorporates different types 
of data from different sources, which enables the researcher to acquire a more comprehensive 
understanding of the subject being studied.32 To fit this requirement, both primary and 
secondary resources were examined. A literature research was pursued as interviews with top 
political officials in Kenya would have been incredibly hard to execute. For that reason, this 
thesis is built on an extensive review of the literature regarding Kenya’s mediation, the violence 
and the power sharing phase. Secondary literature was selected on the basis of the reputation 
of the scholars. Mostly literature from well-known scholars that have created the basis of 
research into the field has been drawn from. In addition, a balance was sought between 
international and nation scholars, as many Kenyan scholars have examined the mediation and 
power sharing in their home country. Official documents drawn up during and after the 
mediation, such as the National Accord, have been extensively analyzed. Secondary sources, 
such as academic articles and books, in which academics have combined and summarized 
results from primary literature, have also been thoroughly studied. The findings from both 
types of sources have been combined in this research.  
 
1.6.3. Limitations 
Although the secondary literature approach fits the aims of this research, certain unavoidable 
limitations should be noted. First, because this study relies on secondary literature, the data in 
this thesis is not in any way exhaustive. More in-depth and on-the-ground research is necessary 
to make a conclusive analysis. Secondly, because of the novelty of Raffoul’s theory, the 
application of it to Kenya’s case is not in any way exhaustive nor conclusive. Although this 
thesis will research the appliance of Raffoul’s theory to the Kenyan case, this dissertation does 
not draw conclusions as to the wider application of the theory, as more research employing the 




This chapter has illustrated that the most suitable research strategy for this study is the 
interpretive case study method, based on the research question and objectives of this research. 
This thesis will use both primary and secondary sources and apply documentary analysis in 
 
32 Yin, “Case Study”, pp 34. 
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order to obtain data. Both primary and secondary data will be drawn from multiple sources. 
Despite the fact that this research approach has limitations, the data assembled will be sufficient 




2. Literature Review: Power sharing in Kenya  
This chapter constitutes a short literature review of what various authors have written on power 
sharing in general, before zooming in on the process of mediation and power sharing in Kenya. 
Power sharing is a topic that has been researched profoundly in the scholarly literature. As 
mentioned in the chapter before, since the 1990s, most negotiated peace agreements have 
included elements of power sharing.33 In an effort to bring an end to prolonged civil conflict in 
countries such as Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda, power sharing governments were introduced 
to appease all groups. As a result of the perceived success of power sharing agreements in some 
of these cases, power sharing became a favorite method of mediators to settle conflict.34 As 
Hoddie and Matthew point out, power sharing first came to the attention of the academic 
community as a result of Arend Lijphart’s studies, in which he argues that pluralistic 
communities that use elements of power sharing would be able to wield power consensually. 
This point of view was reinforced by Eric Nordlinger, who appeals that power sharing can be 
deployed to control conflict in deeply divided societies. However, neither scholar linked these 
practices of power sharing in institutions to the process of negotiation. Yet in post-conflict 
societies where neither party has won the right to outline new rules and institutions during the 
conflict, elements of power sharing via mediated discussion is often the reality.35  
 
 McCulloch and McEvoy point out that third parties regularly incentivize competing groups to 
accept, preserve and transform power sharing institutions. Third-party mediators are generally 
inclined to propose resolutions with clear exit strategies that focus on short-term solutions.36 
As Mehler notes, power sharing is attractive to peace negotiators as they are often looking for 
a solution that will bring a quick end to the conflict and they are usually under extreme pressure 
to come up with a resolution.37 However, Mehler argues that power sharing often undermines 
the practice of democracy and peace negotiations that result in power sharing agreements give 
rebels and would-be leaders an incentive to cause insurgencies.38 This view is supported by 
McCulloch and McEvoy, who note that power sharing can encourage political fanaticism and 
ethnic outbidding. This outbidding might lead to collapse, unless one of the parties is willing 
 
33 Anne Jarstad, “The Prevalence of Power Sharing: Exploring the Patterns of Post-Election Peace”, Africa 
Spectrum 3 (2009): 42. 
34 Nic Cheeseman, “The Internal Dynamics of Power Sharing in Africa”, Democratization 18:2 (2011): 336. 
35 Hartzell and Hoddie, “Institutionalizing Peace”, pp 319. 
36 McCulloch and McEvoy, “International Mediation”, pp 469. 
37 Mehler, “Peace and Power Sharing”, pp 453. 
38 Ibid, pp 455. 
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to back down. As such, political immobilism – the inability to create or implement policy as a 
result of protracted disagreements – can lead to defection. However, concession can lead to a 
loss of credibility and voter support as well.39 As a result, there is an academic debate about 
whether power sharing institutions facilitate political stability. 
 
Anne Jarstad, one of the most quoted researchers in the field of power sharing, notes that even 
though power sharing can prevent violence in the short-term, it can be regarded as a constraint 
on democracy. It seldomly solves all the issues at stake and usually means an 
institutionalization of polarization in divided societies.40 Multiple scholars, such as Nic 
Cheeseman and Ian Spears, analyze power sharing in Africa specifically.41 The majority of 
scholars problematizes power sharing as a means of conflict resolution.  For example, Spears 
argues that power sharing agreements rarely stand the test of time. After examining peace 
processes in Rwanda and Sierra Leone, he notes that power sharing is a remarkably unstable 
form of governance that in the best-case scenario only provides temporarily relieve from 
violent conflict. Power sharing is in most cases only a temporary break from conflict, not a 
resolution.42 Despite multiple authors criticizing the use of power sharing, it is still one of the 
most used agreements used to conclude mediation. There are few functioning alternatives that 
will prevent violence in the short-term.43 Power sharing is also increasingly used to solve 
political crises that emerge as a result of post-electoral violence.44 Kenya is an example of this. 
There is limited literature available on power sharing in Kenya, however, this literature review 
focuses on four main themes that emerge repeatedly throughout the literature reviewed. These 
themes are elitist politics, interethnic power sharing, justice reforms, and constitutional 
provisions. 
 
Nic Cheeseman and Andreas Mehler are arguably two of the most famous scholars in the 
literature on power sharing in Africa. Both have published considerable work in the field and 
are some of the most quoted researchers. In his article on power sharing in Kenya and 
Zimbabwe, which he wrote with Zimbabwean scholar Blessing-Miles Tendi, Cheeseman 
 
39 McCulloch and McEvoy, “International Mediation”, pp 469. 
40 Jarstad, “Prevalence”, pp 42. 
41 See for example Nic Cheeseman, “The Internal Dynamics of Power Sharing in Africa”, Democratization 18:2 
(2011): 336-365. 
42 Ian Spears, “Africa: The Limits of Power-Sharing”, Journal of Democracy 13:3 (2002): 123. 
43 Jarstad, “Prevalence”, pp 42. 
44 Cheeseman and Tendi, “Unity Government”, pp 204. 
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presents a comparative analysis of unity governments in the two countries. Critical of power 
sharing arrangements in political crises, Cheeseman and Tendi research the historical roots of 
veto players in power sharing governments and how the implementation of the power sharing 
agreement is affected by these veto players.45 They look at the Kenyan political sphere from 
an elite perspective, in which elite consensus and division define the stability of the post-
colonial state.46 They emphasize that the Kenyan crisis was not a conflict between two clear-
cut factions, as political alliances in Kenya have always been fluid since independence and 
politicians regularly switch parties. Neither of the PNU and the ODM had the monopoly on 
victimhood and both factions had an interest in preventing post-election prosecutions, as 
atrocities were committed on both sides. Cheeseman and Tendi assert that because of these 
common interests and a history of elite inclusion, key veto players agreed to a power sharing 
settlement.47 Power sharing in Kenya enabled elites to build new alliances to maximize their 
own conditions of service, which Cheeseman and Tendi call ‘the politics of collusion’. It is 
through these new alliances that Kenya’s legislators have been capable of exercising their veto 
to prevent prosecution and to continue Kenya’s state of impunity.48 Although Cheeseman and 
Tendi’s account on elite politics is clear, well-written and convincing, they do not elaborate on 
the nature of the alliances that Kenyan politicians create. They mention the alliance between 
Uhuru Kenyatta and William Rutoto avoid prosecution by the ICC49, but they fail to 
incorporate the manipulation of ethnicity by Kenyan politicians and the utilization of identity, 
which are so often exploited to mobilize voter support and form the basis of elite alliances. 
Andreas Mehler follows a route similar to that of Cheeseman and Tendi regarding elites in his 
paper on peace and power sharing in Africa. Like Cheeseman and Tendi, he criticizes power 
sharing as a means to conflict management as it sacrifices democracy in the name of peace.50 
He also notes that most peace negotiations revolve around warring factions and leave out 
civilian parties, thereby enshrining culprits of violence safely into government.51 For the 
Kenyan case, he notes that the peace agreement had numerous ambiguities, which led to 
continuous fighting the first few months into the power sharing.52 In addition, he calls the 
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agreement an “elite pact”, as civilians were not included and the reality of the power sharing 
settlement revolved around the concerns of the political elite; no root causes were addressed.53 
However, he does not specify how the concerns of civilians could be mitigated or how elitist 
the agreement was. This leaves room for a more detailed research into the Kenyan case. Both 
Mehler and Cheeseman and Tendi conclude that power sharing is not a sustainable solution to 
conflict resolution, as unity governments generally postpone conflicts rather than resolve 
them.54 
 
Gilbert Khadiagala carries out an in-depth analysis of coalition building by Kenyan political 
parties against a background of ethnic division. He argues that ethnic political management has 
been the key element driving the formation of ethnic alliances in the Kenyan political sphere, 
together with the lingering legacy of the one-party state.55 According to Khadiagala, it has been 
incredibly difficult organizing parties in Kenya, as old constitutional rules and structures have 
continuously hindered actors seeking to build alliances outside their ethnic group.56 He claims 
that Kenya’s political system in itself is too weak to build interethnic alliances, as parties are 
too weak to evolve their moralistic norms and values and therefore cannot enter into genuine 
coalitions.57 When in 2008 the mediation by Kofi Annan resulted in the creation of a grand 
coalition that incorporated members from both sides on a 50/50 basis, it would not function, 
according to Khadiagala’s statements regarding coalitions in Kenya’s politics. Indeed, he notes 
that the power sharing government has experienced challenging problems as he argues there 
were two centers of power built on equally weak coalitions.58 After two years of power sharing, 
ethnic tensions started to emerge within the ODM when Odinga and Ruto had a disagreement, 
thereby pitting Luo’s against Kalenjins within the cabinet. Similar issues surfaced on the PNU 
side, where politicians that intended to run in the 2013 elections started stirring up tensions to 
mobilize supporters.59 Although ethnic tensions remain a problem in Kenyan politics, 
Khadiagala does not clearly explain the origins of said tensions, nor does he sufficiently apply 
his coalition-building theory to the power sharing period in Kenya, which creates unclarities 
around the topic. After reading his article, it remains questionable why Kenya has not been 
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able to create political parties that exceed ethnic lines. Emma Elfversson and Anders Sjögren 
also research ethnopolitical hostility in Kenya, even though they combine an analysis of the 
local experience of power sharing with national politics. By examining two cases in Kenya in 
two different counties, they investigate how local power sharing affects ethnopolitical hostility 
on a local level.60 They focus on two towns in the Rift Valley, where tensions between Kikuyus 
and Kalenjin were the highest during the 2007-PEV. They conclude that in one of the cases, in 
Nakuru, the provisions made by the power sharing agreement, such as equal resource 
allocation, has stabilized relations between the two communities.61 In the other town however, 
Uasin Gishu, the situation remained hostile due to the absence of a structured commitment. In 
addition, national politics derailed local peace processes as important political figures, such as 
Ruto, called for continuous resistance against the Kikuyu community.62 This demonstrates that 
although power sharing provisions were made on both national and local levels, the effects did 
not run deep. Below the surface, ethic divisions create lingering hostility, both on local and 
national levels. However, neither article further examines the provisions of the power sharing 
agreement to understand where the continuous hostility comes from or could be addressed. 
 
Jacqueline Klopp is a well-known scholar in the field of Kenyan politics. She has done 
extensive research into Kenya’s political system and the implications of historical legacies on 
contemporary politics. Her contribution to the power sharing literature on Kenya has been 
carried out mainly through research from the perspective of justice reforms. In her article, she 
reflects on the contents of the National Accord and its ramifications in the years following the 
signing of the agreement. She is incredibly sceptic of the power sharing agreement as she notes 
that the key culprits of Kenya’s violence are now safely entrenched into the highest levels of 
government and in charge of reforms.63 However, she notes that that is the usual course of 
events in power sharing settlements. Her article centers around the question on whether Kenya 
can transform and overcome the deep divisions that were caused by the violence. She also 
ponders whether Kenya’s population can prevail over their highly corruptive politicians.64 
Klopp points out that one year after the signing of the agreement, little has changed, despite 
promises that reforms would be implemented one year after signing. She argues that Kenya’s 
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government has not managed to address the humanitarian crisis that followed the violence; 
rather, the government has only exacerbated the crisis by violently removing IDPs from refugee 
camps into hostile communities.65 In addition, she points out that the government has done 
little to nothing to address long-term issues such as land reforms and political accountability. 
Multiple corruption scandals after the mediation illustrates that even after the Accord, 
politicians use the government as a “site of eating” and aim to maintain political control through 
patronage practices.66 Klopp argues that the only way to achieve reforms in Kenya is through 
continuous third-party support and incentives.67 However, this is fairly unrealistic as the 
international community tends to lose its interest when a certain state of peace is achieved 
whereby violence is largely absence. Also, Klopp’s article was written in 2009, when power 
sharing had only been in place for one year. Analyzing the full period of power sharing up to 
2013 will give a more complete picture of the impact of power sharing on the country’s long-
term issues. Sadiki Koko argues that a power sharing agreement as a result of a mishandled 
electoral process impairs the pursuit of justice and the advocacy for human rights.68 He claims 
that the Government of National Unity (GNU) was detrimental for democracy and represented 
a major setback for Kenyan democratic processes, as he argues there was significant 
democratic maturity demonstrated during the 2002 elections.69 Koko criticizes the various 
commissions that were set up after the signing of the agreement that were to research human 
rights abuses as “half-baked jobs”.70 However, it is too simplistic and unfair to blame these 
commissions for not producing enough details in his opinion, as the commissions were 
continuously opposed by the Kenyan government and had to carry out their research under 
extreme political heat. In addition, Soko fails to explain why power sharing agreements 
specifically impair the pursuit of justice; from his article it appears that any dysfunctional state 
would undermine justice. It is not clear why he blames power sharing governments specifically. 
 
Lastly, a number of scholars analyzes the power sharing agreement from a constitutional point 
of view. Ever since independence, Kenya has struggled with tensions around constitutional 
reform, as the constitution negotiated during independence ensured a highly centralized 
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presidency with little accountability.71 Former presidents Kenyatta and Moi made recurrent 
amends to the constitution to increase the power of the executive. Calls for a new, more 
democratic constitution became central to political opposition and Kenyan elections.72 Westen 
Shilaho argues that the violence in 2007 opened up opportunities for change. The power 
sharing cabinet created circumstances for constitutional reform. As a result, Kenyans finally 
voted for a new constitution in 2010 during a referendum, after decades of campaigning.73 With 
67,25% of Kenyan citizens in favor of the new constitution, the draft was approved. For the 
first time in Kenyan history, the constitution made provisions to address skewed resource 
allocation and ethnic polarization.74 Although Shilaho mentions that power sharing provided 
the opportunity for reforms, he does not elaborate on this notion, nor does he go into detail 
what reforms he implies. Henry Amadi, a Kenyan lecturer teaching political science at the 
University of Nairobi, feared that Kenya’s grand coalition would be an obstacle to 
constitutional reform. Since his article was written before 2010, it does not include the 2010 
constitutional reform. However, it is included in this literature review as it demonstrates how 
many scholars described the dysfunctional nature of the unity government and the skepticism 
amongst Kenyan scholars regarding the creation of a new constitution. Amadi asserts that the 
discussion regarding constitutional reform was continuously undermined by unending 
bickering between the parties about the distribution of power and wealth. Moreover, he argues 
that constitutional reforms were stalled because both parties feared the crippling effects of the 
campaigning for the referendum on their general position in government.75 In addition, he notes 
that Kenyan politicians continue to be led by their selfish interests protecting their own 
interests, rather than the interests of Kenyan citizens.76 It is for these reasons that he claims that 
constitutional reforms had not been addressed. Since constitutional reforms were promised to 
be carried out within one year after the signing of the agreement, he obviously makes a valid 
point. Kenyan politicians deliberately stalled the process of constitutional reforms. However, 
to many people’s surprise, they eventually managed to create a new constitution. This indicates 
that there are more dynamics at play, which the majority of scholars ignore. 
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This literature review has reviewed literature from the four different perspectives that were 
mostly discussed in the scholarly literature. Power sharing in Kenya is generally studied from 
a viewpoint of elite politics, as described by Cheeseman and Mehler. However, these scholars 
do not narrate the origins of elite alliances and completely neglect the ethnic identity 
perspective. Khadiagala and Elfversson and Sjögren do discuss the ethnic side of power sharing 
in Kenya. Both the articles note that power sharing did not appear to run deep and hostilities 
were boiling on both national and regional levels, but neither article examines the power 
sharing agreement into depth to explain this phenomenon. Klopp and Koko both argue justice 
has not been adequately pursued by the coalition government. Although reforms were supposed 
to be made one year after the signing of the Accord, none of the promised changes were 
realized. Nonetheless, Klopp only analyzed the situation in 2009 and not for the full extent of 
the power sharing agreement. Lastly, Shilaho and Amadi reflected on constitutional reforms. 
However, like Klopp, Amadi wrote his article in 2009, before the new constitution was 
introduced. Shilaho does not trace back the constitutional reforms sufficiently to the power 
sharing cabinet. After all this research, a gap can be determined in the literature. None of the 
scholars sufficiently combine different perspectives but tend to focus on one angle, even though 
perspectives are often intertwined. Therefore, this dissertation aims to fill that gap by 
combining different variables together. Moreover, even though the power sharing agreement 
was the result of an intense six-week mediation, the mediation is barely mentioned in the 
literature in relation to power sharing. However, the power sharing agreement dictated the 
course of the power sharing cabinet. Therefore, this thesis aims to fill the gaps in the literature 
by researching how the mediation affected power sharing in Kenya. 
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3. Theoretical framework 
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the theoretical framework. This dissertation uses the 
theoretical framework regarding power sharing as developed by Alexandre Raffoul. Raffoul is 
a researcher at Swiss Peace, which is a practice-oriented peace research institute in 
Switzerland. This chapter will give a short overview of Raffoul’s research into power sharing 
and mediation, followed by an explanation on how this dissertation will apply his framework. 
Raffoul has developed five variables to examine the success of power sharing. In addition, he 
has created five variables that focus on mediation to research the effect that mediation can have 
on the performance of power sharing. These variables need to be combined one on one for each 
section to answer the research question. The first section of this chapter, which elaborates on 
power sharing, will also describe the five variables regarding power sharing. The last section, 
which centres around mediation, will include the five variables on mediation. In the conclusion, 
a roadmap to this dissertation’s analysis will be provided. 
 
3.2. The power sharing dilemma 
In his article on the power sharing, Raffoul centres his research around the issue of the power 
sharing dilemma, which he describes as “whilst the promise of power sharing might be 
necessary in the short-run to secure the adherence of the conflict parties to a peace agreement, 
power sharing tends to create problems that thwart peacebuilding and reconciliation in the long 
run”.77 According to him, the literature identifies the power sharing dilemma quite extensively, 
however, it provides limited understanding on how it can be addressed.78 He starts his article 
with unpacking power sharing. He argues that, although there are differences in institutional 
design, all power-sharing systems base decision-making on the practice of consensus, rather 
than majority, which is the case in democracies. For that reason, in any power sharing 
agreement, the performance of power sharing institutions relies on the presence of cooperation 
between former enemies at an elite level.79 
 
The durability and “success” of a power sharing agreement is a topic that is heavily debated in 
the power sharing literature. What can be achieved with a power sharing agreement – for 
example sustainable peace, a cessation of violence, or an openness to compromise – remains 
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open to debate. There is no one definition as to what the success of power sharing entails in the 
academic literature. Also, whereas power sharing agreements were initially primarily used to 
settle civil wars, they are now regarded as the fastest way to settle various political crises on 
the African continent, therefore expanding the definitions of the application and durability of 
the agreements.80 Various authors point out the possible benefits of a power sharing agreement 
as an interim agreement. Timothy Sisk mentions that power sharing appears the most durable 
when the consociational model is used, as it secures the principles of democracy. Sisk notices 
that for mediators, the “success” of power sharing agreements is directly derived from a “stop 
of the killing” and the security guarantees an agreement offers.81 However, Sisk argues that in 
the long run, power sharing agreements, including the consociationalist model, have long-
lasting negative implications for sustainable peace as ethnic lines become deeper entrenched 
in the society82. Hartzell and Hoddie analyze the success of power sharing by researching the 
likelihood of a society to return to civil war. As such, they equal the success of power sharing 
as a lack of violence in the society previously at war. They argue that by creating multi-faceted 
power sharing agreements that address security concerns are the most successful in preventing 
civil war in the long run.83 Mehler’s arguments regarding the success of power sharing are 
much in line with Sisk’s assertions. He notes that the success of a mediation, which usually 
leads to elements of power sharing in a peace agreement, is different for everyone involved. 
Those at the negotiation table usually find solace in a power sharing agreement, as it offers 
everyone at the table a piece of the pie. Negotiators tend to push for power sharing agreements, 
as those are regarded as the fastest way to stop the violence. However, citizens might prefer 
finding long-term solutions to underlying problems.84 As a result, in the short-term power 
sharing agreements may be regarded as “successful”, as they can bring an end to violence in 
the short term. However, in the long-term, the success of a power sharing agreement remains 
largely debated. 
 
Raffoul argues that the durability of a power sharing settlement relies on elite cooperation. He  
Raffoul argues that joint decision-making can act as an indicator of the performance of power 
sharing. The act of power sharing is in itself a paradox, as elite cooperation between former 
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enemies is incredibly hard to accomplish because of a history of violence, but at the same time 
necessary for power sharing to perform satisfactorily.85 Therefore, Raffoul defines the 
durability and success of a power sharing agreement as the ability of the elite to cooperate, but 
notes five common barriers to elite cooperation in war-to-peace transitions: problems relating 
to the balance of power; inside spoilers; outside spoilers; problems relating to identity and 
political accountability; and credible commitment problems. The following section explains all 
five variables into detail. 
 
Balance of power problems arise when there is an imbalance in parties’ preferences; some 
parties might favour a military victory, whereas others support power sharing agreements. 
Peace agreements are adopted when all parties to the mediation are assured that their future 
participation in governance is properly captured. In power sharing agreements, this means that 
the balance of power is levelled within political institutions to guarantee all actors access to 
decision making on the highest political level.86 However, Raffoul points out that problems 
might arise after signing the agreement, when changes in the power equilibrium occur due to 
alterations in the demographic, economic or military structure in the country.87 When shifts 
occur post-agreement in the power equilibrium, they can function as an incentive for the more 
powerful party to seize the opportunity to challenge an agreement that does not accurately 
reflect the power share they are convinced they are entitled to.88 
 
Inside spoilers emerge when parties sign the agreement without being fully committed as a 
result of excessive external pressure or as a tactic.89 Leaders or parties that are convinced that 
the signing of a peace agreement threatens their interests or power pose a great risk to peace 
making, as they may resolve to undermining peace endeavours.90 Inside spoilers sign the peace 
agreement but yet fail to commit to the obligations of the agreement. Inside spoilers often 
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employ covert methods, as they want to keep their threat hidden. As such, inside spoilers 
generally aim to keep violence to a minimum.91 
Outside spoilers can arise when excluded actors disagree with the peace-making process and 
decide to derail the process they are not part of.92 Outside spoilers are either banned from the 
peace negotiations or exclude themselves, and resort to violence to undermine the peace 
process.93 Peace negotiations that tend to exclude certain parties to the conflict are more likely 
to experience spoiler problems, as they may regard peace as a threat.94 Secondly, actors are 
more likely to become spoilers when they perceive power-sharing agreements as rewarding 
violence. This can incentivize rebel groups to splinter and to resort back to violence, thereby 
becoming outside spoilers.95 
 
Identity and political accountability problems emerge from the often-emotional discourse that 
surrounds identity issues, which makes identity conflict extremely hard to resolve.96 Power 
sharing in ethnic conflicts is introduced to ensure that minor groups are not excluded from 
governance in the post-conflict period. However, in the long run, power sharing tends to 
contribute to deepening wartime divisions in ethnically divided societies and impede 
reconciliation between former opponents.97 Power sharing tends to create incentives for ethnic 
leaders to become hardliners and to escalate the conflict, marginalizing moderates in the 
process. In addition, power sharing institutions can become weapons, as ethnically focused 
politicians can use institutions to block elite cooperation.98 
 
Credible commitment problems arise because of distrust between parties; parties tend to be 
reluctant to sign the agreement as there are risks of defection from the enemy.99 Power sharing 
agreements are designed to resolve credible commitment problems as they focus on an equal 
distribution of power to prevent exclusion from political power in the post-war society. By 
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dividing and balancing power amongst all groups, power-sharing ensures no one group 
becomes dominant and starts threatening the security of others.100 However, Raffoul notes that 
credible commitment problems are likely to arise in the post-agreement phase. Post-conflict 
institutions are often too weak to instil confidence in the parties, which can hinder post-
agreement elite cooperation.101 In addition, power sharing agreements may contain ambiguities 
or unresolved issues, which can also contribute to credible commitment problems.102  
 
3.3. Power sharing performance and mediation 
Raffoul notes that differences in the durability of power sharing imply that the severity of the 
power sharing dilemma is not consistent across different cases. He argues that although the 
literature attributes this to institutional design matters103, this explanation does not fully satisfy 
the argument, as even institutional design results from elite bargaining between different actors. 
In addition, after signing peace agreements, institutions are generally weak and unable to 
provide guarantees to mistrustful parties.104 The second stream of literature that aims to provide 
an explanation for the variations in the performance of power sharing that Raffoul distinguishes 
looks at the role of third parties in the process of sharing power. Third parties are often found 
to play key roles in applying pressure onto parties to adopt and implement power sharing 
agreements. They are also present in addressing problems during the implementation phase.105 
However, Raffoul points out that external pressures and incentives can create problems in terms 
of the legitimacy of the agreement, the commitment of parties to the agreement or the 
dependence of the success of the agreement on third party pressures.106 Nonetheless, he 
suggests that the third party argument can be viewed from a different perspective, as third 
parties not only exert power and apply pressure, but also establish channels of communication 
between the culprits, who would have otherwise not have been in a position to negotiate a 
settlement. Mediators support parties by creating a minimal level of trust necessary to create 
peace and help the belligerents establish mutually acceptable agreements.107 Therefore, he 
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argues that if the capacity of elites to collaborate in the post-agreement phase is restricted by 
the re-emergence of war-to-peace transition problems, then the long-term performance of 
power sharing is contingent on the ability of political leaders to successfully bargain solutions 
to the problems that arise in the post-agreement phase. Vice-versa, the collapse of power 
sharing agreements can be traced back to the inability of elites to renegotiate solutions to these 
problems.108 
 
This dissertation uses Raffoul’s framework to examine how Annan’s mediation in 2008 has 
affected power sharing in Kenya from 2008 to 2013. Raffoul has established five variables 
through which he analyses the performance of power sharing as mentioned before, namely: 
problems relation to the balance of power, inside and outside spoilers, problems relating to 
identity and political accountability and credible commitment problems. To research each 
variable, he has created five variables concerning mediation that can be linked to the variables 
regarding power sharing, to research the effects that the mediation had on power sharing. These 
five variables that examine mediation are: the use of leverage; horizontal inclusivity; relation-
ship building; vertical inclusivity; and content of the agreement. The following section 
elaborates on the variables that concern mediation and explains the link to the variables on 
power sharing. 
 
The first variable is the use of leverage by the mediating team. Many scholars and mediation 
practitioners assume effective mediation relies on the mediator’s leverage and political 
power.109 Mediators can use the so-called “sticks and carrots” to pressure the fighting parties 
into an agreement. Bercovitch argues that power diplomacy, in which the mediator uses 
leverage to reach a cessation of violence, is more effective than soft diplomacy, in which the 
mediator takes on a more accommodating approach.110 However, Raffoul points out that these 
notions are flawed, as for example mediators without access to leverage but with a considerable 
amount of integrity and moral stature achieve exceptional results, such as the World Council 
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leverage to pressure parties into an agreement.112 Raffoul argues that as mediators typically do 
not remain involved after the crisis, these temporary effects are likely to decrease, as the 
mediator’s influence diminishes, and the parties’ positions change over time. Thus, peace 
agreements that are accepted due to third-party pressure are often untenable in the long-term 
without constant third-party reinforcement.113 When parties deem an agreement unfavourable 
because it was created under heavy external pressures, problems relating to the balance of 
power can emerge, as more powerful parties seek to defect.114 
 
Horizontal inclusivity can be defined as the participation of key stakeholders in peace 
negotiations who have the ability to implement and/or spoil peace and who represent important 
constituencies.115 This encompasses independent actors and groups that are considered to be 
part of the traditional or developing post-war ‘elite’ and as such have social, military and/or 
political power and influence. These actors range from governments, militia leaders and 
political groups to business elites and religious authorities.116 These groups that wield sufficient 
power to spoil the peace constitute horizontal inclusivity. Raffoul argues that horizontal 
inclusivity is of great importance in mediation processes as upcoming research suggests it is a 
critical requirement for a sustainable exit from violence. When negotiations exclude main 
parties to the conflict, incentives might be created to derail the process by parties not 
included.117 As a result, outside spoilers to the peace process can emerge.118 
Relationship-building focuses on whether or not the agreement has been too hastily accepted 
or with too little ownership from the parties. Raffoul points out that agreements that lack 
ownership or are adopted in a hurry undermine the commitment of the parties.119 Whatever the 
specific origins of a conflict, actors tend to observe each other with deep scepticism and 
hostility.120 Brahimi and Ahmed support this notion and note that time needs to be reserved to 
work out these issues so as to instil confidence and trust in the peace process and in each 
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other.121 Raffoul observes that in order to facilitate implementation, mediations should focus 
on building trust between the parties.122 Through relationship-building during the mediation 
process, parties can help actors develop a shared vision of a desirable future and pursue a route 
of mutual reassurance.123 This is important as agreements that are signed without investing in 
building trust between parties are more vulnerable to inside spoilers, as parties do not feel 
committed and aim to destabilize the peace from inside.124 
 
Vertical inclusivity can be defined as “the extent to which larger segments of the population 
have access to, and influence over, decision making – with a specific emphasis on (previously) 
marginalized societal sectors”.125 This constitutes popular involvement in decision making and 
thus citizen’s participation the mediation process, thereby particularly taking into account 
groups that have traditionally been excluded from the decision-making process, such as 
women, and specific cultural or ethnic groups.126 Vertical inclusion can be promoted by 
strengthening the “state-society” contract and empowering marginalized groups.127 Raffoul 
notes that peace negotiations that are inherently elitist, top-down and secretive often fail to 
address the security concerns of the general population and therefore do not generate civilian 
support, which jeopardizes the political settlement.128 Elite-pact negotiations do not produce 
opportunities for people that did not pick up arms, such as other political organizations and the 
general public to have a voice in forming the agreements or endorsing them. This can become 
a problem when the representatives included in the negotiation are not regarded as legitimate 
representatives of public interests.129 Inclusivity of political settlements contributes to the 
stability and legitimacy of the state. Therefore, Raffoul advocates for multi-track diplomacy.130 
Vertical inclusivity is important to prevent problems of identity and political accountability, as 
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excluded populations tend to vote for political hardliners and do not support a power sharing 
agreement.131 
 
Lastly, Raffoul notes that the content of the agreement is incredibly important in preventing 
conflict relapse and is influenced by whether the agreement focuses on resolving root causes 
of the conflict or aims at merely bringing an end to the violence.132 The peace agreement in 
international mediation functions as a bridge between bringing an end to war and starting the 
peacebuilding process. Its contents therefore deeply influence justice, power, human rights, 
governance and the probability for violent conflict to break out again.133 The existence of 
unresolved issues in a political settlement heightens the risk of failure in power sharing 
agreements.134 It is very rare for sustainable peace to occur when extremely sensitive core 
issues are not included in the peace negotiations and not present in the contents of the 
agreement.135 Therefore, the content of the agreement is crucial in the success or failure of the 
political settlement. The content of the agreement affects credible commitment problems, as 
power sharing agreements regularly contain ambiguities or leave unresolved issues. This can 
culminate into recurring conflicts and plain hindrance in the implementation phase.136 
 
3.4. Conclusion 
This chapter has laid out the theoretical framework as it was created by Alexandre Raffoul. 
The framework was developed because power sharing appears to work in the short run, but 
problems emerge in the long-term. Raffoul calls this the power sharing dilemma. He argues 
that power sharing depends on the ability of political elites to cooperate and come to a 
consensus. However, he identifies five barriers to elite cooperation: problems relating to the 
balance of power, inside and outside spoilers, identity and political accountability problems 
and credible commitment problems. He argues that the problems of power sharing are located 
in the mediation that precede it. Therefore, five variables regarding mediation have been 
explained that affect long-term power sharing. These variables will be combined one on one in 
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the analysis chapters of this mediation, to research how the mediation in Kenya has affected 








4. The 2007 Post-Electoral Violence 
This chapter elaborates on the post-election violence that took place during and directly after 
the 2007 elections in Kenya. The purpose of this chapter is to first elaborate on the outbreak of 
violence into detail, after which a number of causes of violence are explored. The post-election 
crisis in Kenya entailed different types of violence: spontaneous, premeditated and state-
sanctioned, all of which will be discussed in this chapter. It is important to note that there is no 
single clarification that explains the outbreak of violence. Rather, the fundamental issues 
underlying the violence are complex, diverse and interwoven. This chapter zooms in on 
political exclusion, land issues, the diffusion of violence, political tribalism and unemployment 
and poverty as causes of the tensions. 
 
4.2. The election crisis 
The 2007 elections in Kenya were the fourth since the re-introduction of multiparty politics in 
1992. Violence has been an important element of every election campaign since 1992. In the 
early 1990s, over 1,000 people were killed in the Rift Valley and a quarter million displaced, 
as supporters of KANU137 and Moi exploited state resources to instigate violence against 
political opponents, who mostly consisted of immigrant communities that had moved to the 
Rift Valley since the 1960s. Ever since, violence has become a prominent element of election 
periods.138 In 2007, 108 parties were contending for 210 parliamentary seats, with three 
primary candidates at presidential level: incumbent Mwai Kibaki leading the PNU, Raila Oding 
leading the ODM, and Kalonzo Musyoka representing ODM-Kenya. However, after 
preliminary voting results it soon became clear that the presidential race would be between 
Kibaki and Odinga.139 Following a close-fought, divisive campaign with ethnic undertones, 
Kenyans went to vote in record numbers. After the 2002 voting victory, in which Kenyans 
successfully removed Moi from power after 24 years of draconian rule140, the atmosphere 
surrounding the 2007 elections was hopeful. In certain regions, there were serious irregularities 
reported on both sides. However, the most serious actions of fraud were carried out during the 
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last stages of the counting the presidential poll, when it appears there was a last-minute attempt 
to manipulate the competition in favor of Kibaki under the auspices of the Electoral 
Commission of Kenya (ECK).141 In the final hours of tallying, a lead of over a million votes 
for opposition candidate Raila Odinga evaporated under suspicious circumstances and 
reappeared as an incredibly thin victory margin for Kibaki.142 This was also at odds with the 
previously announced parliamentary election results, in which the ODM had secured 99 seats 
against 43 seats for the PNU.143 Confusion and public outrage followed the announcement of 
the results. Five electoral commissioners publicly condemned the apparent rigging and even 
the head of the ECK later noted that he was unable to establish who won the vote. In an attempt 
to avoid any challenge to his ‘win’, Kibaki had himself hurriedly sworn in without the presence 
of any media or spectators. International observers condemned the tallying process and the 
presidential election results were cast in doubts and confusion. Kenyans, eager to follow their 
democratic process, were denied access to the process by a nationwide media shutdown ordered 
by the government, which contributed to insecurity and tensions around the country. Within 
hours of the publication of the results, violence engulfed the country.144 The violence took on 
different forms: spontaneous, pre-meditated and state-sanctioned. The following section will 
look into all three types. 
 
4.2.1. Spontaneous violence  
Spontaneous riots and protests immediately started emerging after the announcement of results. 
After the successful elections in 2002 it was expected that, if defeated, Kibaki would step down 
and give in to the people’s wishes. Anger was sparked by the tensions surrounding the 
declaration of Kibaki as ‘winner’, the outright rigging of elections, and the thwarted 
expectation that Odinga would win the elections.145 Odinga had the majority of votes in six out 
of eight provinces and the support of the Luo, Luhya, Kalenjin and the support of the Coast, 
North eastern and Nairobi provinces. Moreover, the ODM won the majority seats in 
Parliament. It was therefore virtually impossible for the PNU to win the presidential 
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elections.146 People took to the streets to protest the results, directing their anger at government 
offices and property in Nyanza, setting government property on fire. In Western province, 
youth set up roadblocks and razed shops. In urban spaces, roads were blocked with virtually 
every item in sight, sometimes lighting up roadblocks to complete close off the roads. In Rift 
Valley trees were cut down and used to obstruct the streets.147 By blocking the roads and 
looting, protesters hoped to pressure the government into capitulating and allowing for 
transparent verification of the results. Within days, all roads in Western and Nyanza were 
rendered impassible.148 In Kisumu, government vehicles were set on fire, and businesses 
owned by perceived PNU supporters were destroyed. In the Rift Valley, violence occurred in 
the form of citizen-on-citizen attacks, largely by Kalenjin against their Kikuyu neighbours. 
There are multiple witness accounts that narrate Kikuyu people recognizing their attackers as 
their long-term neighbors. Harrowing testimonies of children and elderly people being beaten 
to death, raped or dehumanized emerged, the most shocking one concerning the incident at the 
church in Eldoret, which was set alight with women and children seeking refuge in it, killing 
seventeen.149 The ODM capitalized on the violence, insisting they had won the elections and 
demanding the resignation of Kibaki. If Kibaki would not give in, the ODM promised more 
protests and violence.150 
 
4.2.2. Premeditated violence  
Sadly, a lot of the violence that took place appeared to be organized well in advance of elections 
and it remains unsure whether it could have been prevented should Odinga have won the 
elections.151 Organized groups, generally involved in brutal actions, behaved in a manner that 
demonstrated a high level of coordination that could not have been attained coincidentally or 
spontaneously. This type of violence included murder and ethnic cleansing and mostly 
occurred in Rift Valley and Nairobi. It started even before the election results were 
announced.152 The Rift Valley exploded into large-scale inter-ethnic violence, mostly directed 
at Kibaki’s Kikuyu ethnic group. In the days leading up to the election, local elders and ODM 
coordinators organized meetings in which they announced that a victory for PNU would be 
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viewed as fraud and as a signal for war against all Kikuyus, who they claimed would be 
complicit to it since they would vote for the PNU. Many people in the Rift Valley mentioned 
later that they were coerced to attend meetings like this, and that violence was widely preached. 
ODMs leadership was not directly implicated in these acts, although evidence was found that 
William Ruto, a prominent Kalenjin member of ODM, used strong anti-Kikuyu rethoric 
leading up to the elections. Nonetheless, in many cases the instigators of violence were 
prominent and well-known individuals.153 The Kikuyu communities took violent revenge by 
mobilizing militia groups like the Mungiki and raising funds to pay the militia and to buy 
weapons, who were then sent for retaliatory attacks on Kalenjin communities. The people 
raising funds for these gangs were prominent Kikuyu people in Nairobi and Naivasha, many 
of them politicians.154 Other militias, such as the Taliban, and the Baghdad Boys from the Luo 
community and the Saboat Land Defence Force from the Kisii group were also responsible for 
some of the organized violence. Hate speech on vernacular radio instigated further violence 
against various ethnic groups. By January 15th, over 500 people were murdered and hundreds 
of thousands were displaced.155 
 
4.2.3. State-sanctioned violence  
The last type of violence that was responsible for many deaths and unrest was the use of 
excessive force by the police. As soon as he was sworn in, Kibaki enforced a nationwide 
blanket ban on public demonstrations. The ban was illegal under Kenyan law, but it was used 
to legitimatize heavy-handed police enforcement, which claimed hundreds of lives.156 The 
police force responded differently to their difficult circumstances in different parts of the 
country. In ODM strongholds, officers were fast to employ lethal force to disperse protesters 
by firing live ammunition. However, pro-government armed militias in Naivasha and Nakuru 
were largely ignored.157 On the evenings of December 29th and December 30th in 2007, police 
caused a bloodbath in ODMs center stronghold and Odinga’s hometown, Kisumu. Officers 
drove into the slums, where they were tasked with containing people to prevent them from 
going to the city center to loot. However, police cars were found to drive into slums and officers 
arbitrarily opening fire on people that they deemed suspicious, killing innocent people and 
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children in the process.158 Of the 1,133 people that died in the post-election violence, 405 died 
of gunshot wounds. The areas that experienced most gunshot wounds were areas perceived as 
ODM areas. A pathologist in Nyanza corroborated that out of the 50 people shot in the region, 
30 were shot from behind and 9 from the side. As a result, one can conclude that the police 
were more likely to pull the trigger in pro-ODM areas.159 Secondly, the police handling of 
sexual violence during the crisis was horrific. The police demonstrated indifference to the 
crime, as cases are cited in which police refused to record the case, or cases in which they made 
the victims choose between reporting a rape or a burglary. In other instances, the police 
themselves were perpetrators of the horrible crime; for example, two victims from the Kibera 
slums recounted how they were gang-raped by seven police officers who entered their house 
pretending to look for weapons. Countless similar stories have emerged of the police using the 
chaos to force themselves on women.160 
 
4.3. Causes of the 2007 violence 
The roots of the 2007 post-election violence are complicated, numerous and interconnected. 
Many authors have sought to comprehend the Kenyan political crisis from different 
perspectives. Various news outlets around the world classified the Kenyan crisis as a tale of 
‘tribal warfare’.161 This thesis explicitly steps away from this notion. It is indisputable that 
rivalry between different ethnic groups was at the heart of the Kenyan crisis. However, one 
should keep in mind that ethnic identities became pertinent because they came to represent 
societal divisions and political dissatisfaction.162 As Ajulu points out, ethnic clashes are not 
tribal conflicts in reality, but rather politically organized battles orchestrated to attain certain 
political and economic privileges.163 It is important to note that violence surrounding elections 
in Kenya was not new. The introduction of the multi-partyism in 1991 saw the emergence of 
violence surrounding every election as incumbent President Moi was using violence to ensure 
his win.164 However, the post-electoral violence that took place in 2007 was extreme in many 
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ways. The 2007 crisis does not have one definable cause; rather, it was an interplay of different 
variables that turned out to be an explosive combination. Due to time and space constraints, 
this thesis will highlight a number of issues that research points out were some of the most 
crucial in precipitating the violence. These are land issues, the diffusion of violence, ethnic 
manipulation and Kenya’s increasingly weaker political economy. 
 
4.2.1. Land issues and displacement 
Land issues constitute a structural factor underlying political violence in 2007. To many 
researchers, historical injustices relating to access and ownership of land comprise one of the 
main causes of conflict. Colonialism established and legitimized extreme inequality and 
exclusion through its land governance system by assigning a small group of white settlers the 
most fertile land in Central Kenya. As mentioned earlier, Africans were confined to 
“homelands”. As such, Africans native to the Central Highlands were pushed out and placed 
in reserves. These land-associated injustices triggered violence during the anti-colonial war by 
the Mau Mau fighters.165 Resolving the land question informed the politics of the transition to 
independence. Towards the end of colonialization, the colonial government succumbed to 
African demands and started returning the Central Highlands to Africans by settlement 
schemes and land purchase programs.166 During independence, the colonial government 
transferred its state structures to a conservative, rural, African elite that was under the 
leadership of Jomo Kenyatta. The colonial land legacy was not transformed during 
independence; rather, it was a shift in leadership but a continuance in policy. This allowed the 
President’s circle to hand out land on a rather arbitrary basis.167 In addition, the post-colonial 
government introduced various ‘willing-buyer, willing seller’ schemes aimed at settling 
smallholder farmers on former white settlers’ land. As pressure arose from former Mau Mau 
combatants, most land was sold to Kikuyu’s. When land turned out to be too little, Kikuyu’s 
were settled in Rift Valley districts, where Kalenjin’s saw their land given away. These 
settlement schemes and their ethnic dimension caused tensions between Kikuyu’s and other 
communities. This in turn contributed to disillusion with the government as elites sought to 
acquire more land, and gave rise to tensions between different ethnic communities, but also the 
 
165 Jacqueline Klopp and Odenda Lumumba, “Reform and Counter-Reform in Kenya’s Land Governance”, 
Review of African Political Economy 44:154 (2017): 581. 
166 Karuti Kanyinga, “The Legacy of the White Highlands: Land Rights, Ethnicity and the Post-2007 Election 
Violence in Kenya”, Journal of Contemporary African Studies 27:3 (2009): 329. 
167 Klopp and Lumumba, “Reform”, pp 582. 
 40 
rich and the poor. Land issues therefore, have inevitably become a focal point around which 
political events revolve.168 Land-based ethnic grievances and tensions caused by the political 
exploitative elite fueled the election violence in 2007. Land was a crucial topic in the 2007 
presidential campaigns. Long-standing Kikuyu resentment was used by ODM to introduce the 
promise of land reform for Rift Valley. This resonated with especially Kalenjins, who felt their 
land was stolen by Kikuyu’s.169 ODM argued that the long-abolished practice of majimboism170 
should be utilized to achieve economic equality for the less-developed regions, so as to gain 
support from the economically marginalized. By doing so, politicians fueled ethnic tensions 
with misinformation by pitting the Kikuyu against all other groups. Therefore, displacement 
became an integral component of the 2007 presidential campaign.171 
 
4.2.2. The diffusion of violence  
Mueller argues that Kenya’s political system even before the 2007 violence was bound to 
implode due to decades of political and economic mismanagement. As a result of this 
mismanagement, Kenya’s government did no longer control violence in the country; 
institutions were weakened due to years of corruption and kleptocracy, and the political elite 
was increasingly fragmentized. The closely contested elections accelerated the process of 
Kenya’s implosion. The government had lost the monopoly of violence during Moi’s era, when 
the former President agreed to multiparty elections in Kenya. As Moi actually despised the idea 
of multipartyism, he was willing to use violence to ensure his win. He introduced Kalenjin 
gangs to murder and uproot opposition voters from other ethnic communities, while his civil 
servants turned a blind eye, forcing his electoral win. This sparked the creation of gangs from 
other ethnic groups, most of them directed by influential politicians during election times in 
the 1990s. Over time, these gangs disappeared into the slums of Nairobi and rural areas in 
Central Kenya, where they became gangs for hire. Every election since, gangs were involved. 
Politicians were no longer able to fully control the gangs, and as a result, the state increasingly 
lost the monopoly of violence. By the time of the 2007 elections, gangs were lying in waiting, 
ready to be called upon, which is precisely what took place.172 The prevalence of violence as a 
political tactic is one of the most compelling elements of Kenyan politics. Indeed, violence has 
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become so normalized that it is observed without any expectation of prosecutions or other 
consequences. Every presidential candidate has a gang that represents them, and a culture of 
complete impunity has been established.173 This prevalence of violence in Kenya limits the 
ability of the state to govern effectively and encourages violent attitudes regarding elections.174 
 
4.2.3. Political tribalism 
Kenyan politics has been closely intertwined with ethnic identities since long before 
independence. The trajectory of ethnicity relating to political participation in Kenya was 
established during the colonial era. Although Kenyans did have different cultural backgrounds 
before colonial times, they were never profoundly articulated or regarded as divisive. However, 
when the British settled in Kenya, they created borders in line with language and culture as a 
strategy to control and overpower their colonial subjects. They called different communities 
“tribes”, and different “homelands” were created. Each “homeland” was appointed to a “tribe’ 
and people were rarely allowed to leave the land appointed to them. As a result, divisiveness 
and hostility between groups was created. Towards the end of colonialism, the creation of 
political parties by Kenyans was legalized. Naturally, most of these parties were organized 
along ethnic lines.175 This trend continued after independence: ethic mistrust deepened by 
colonial policies and independence struggles has had bitter consequences on Kenyan social and 
political society.176 Ethnicity became a political resource used by elites to manipulate ‘their’ 
people whilst distributing patronage structures and client-patron relationships. It grew into a 
strategic instrument for making claims to the power and resources of the state. Ethnicity was 
appropriated for nation and regime building by the incumbent regimes; first under Jomo 
Kenyatta, and then under his successors Moi and Kibaki.177 Ethnic mobilisation was used as 
form of both protection against resentment from other ethnic groups (for example by the 
Kikuyu community after the assassination of Tom Mboya) and aggression (i.e. when the 
Kalenjin community pushed other ethnic groups out of Rift Valley in 1961). It needs to be 
noted that ethnic mobilisation only takes place under certain historical circumstances; under 
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“normal” circumstances Kenya’s various ethnic groups live together peacefully. However, the 
relationship between ethnic mobilisation and conflict is evident.178  
 
Kenya is a country of ethnic minorities rather than explicit ethnic bifurcation such as in 
countries like Rwanda. Since independence, the struggle for the state and power has evolved 
around the four biggest ethnic communities: the Kikuyu, the Luhya, the Luo and the Kalenjin. 
Kenya’s other 38 ethnic groups go back and forth between political tribalism – when they are 
mobilised into other ethnic alliances during election periods – and “moral ethnicity”.179 As a 
result, ethnicity has become the most important and most productive instrument of political 
mobilisation in contemporary Kenyan politics.180 Since the introduction of a multi-party system 
in 1991 politicians have drawn even heavier on ethnic ties as the basis of their political support. 
Politics is regarded as a winner-takes-all ethnic game in which the government and its resources 
are the prize. Different ethnic groups claim that it is now ‘their turn to eat’, as it is common 
knowledge in Kenya that leaders of certain ethnic group will ensure that their ethnic community 
is well-treated and looked after. Since institutions are weak, politicians are viewed as personal 
distributors of goods. The leader of the winning coalition is regarded as the boss ethnic in 
charge and therefore his group will profit most from him being in power. Losing signifies being 
excluded from access to state resources.181 To win an election, the weight of the vote of an 
ethnic community is crucial, as is building alliances with other ethnic groups.182   
 
Kenyan political parties are hardly differentiated by ideology or political programs. They are 
merely ethnic coalitions that change according to the alliances of the people in them. Kenyan 
politicians very easily leave and join other parties when the interests of said politician can be 
advanced by joining another alliance, even if this implicates aligning with an all-time enemy. 
183 Ethnic hate speech and violence in elections can be traced back to the early 1990s, where 
politicians whipped up ethnic hatred as a means to mobilize support. This has been the case for 
every general and presidential election in 1992, 1997, 2002 and also 2007. Ethnic disputes are 
often at the centre of elections, as different political leaders aim to scapegoat another ethnic 
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group in order to gain support from their own ethnic base. This has contributed to a zero-sum 
mentality in Kenyan politics.184 As political victory in Kenya is defined by the ability of the 
winning party to win the support from the majority of the four biggest ethnic groups (Luo, 
Kikuyu, Kalenjin and Luhya), elections are high-risk and generally have profound 
consequences for the stability in the country. The 2007 election was so closely contested that 
it was the most volatile and high-risk election the country had seen to date, as both sides 
scrambled for support. The ODM built its campaign on anti-Kikuyu rhetoric by underscoring 
the domination of Kikuyu’s in virtually every aspect of the economy and maybe even more 
important, in land ownership. ODM campaigned for a more even distribution of wealth and 
opportunities, which attracted the Luo, Kalenjin and part of the Luhya communities.  
 
4.2.4. Poverty and demographics  
When Kibaki first came to power, his administration witnessed an incredible economic success 
as economic growth accelerated from 3.4% in 2003 to 7% in 2007. National poverty levels fell 
considerably and for the first time since the late 1980s the country per capita income rose. 
Kibaki kept true to his promise of free primary education for all and introduced impressively 
effective macroeconomic measures. However, at the same time, political management did not 
equal economic decisions. Even though anti-corruption measures were created, they had little 
effect in reality. A judicial commission was established to examine the Goldenberg scandal, a 
scandal dating from the Moi area in which government officials embezzled more than US$ 800 
million by creating fake diamond exports. Despite the commission’s findings being publicly 
announced in 2006, implicated government representatives went unpunished. In addition, the 
Kibaki government was involved in corruption scandals itself; for instance the Anglo leasing 
scandal, which saw hundreds of millions vanish from state funds. Moreover, the Kibaki 
government did not start the process of constitutional reform, even though it was promised 
ahead of the 2002 elections, which alienated Kenyan society.185 In addition, the economic 
growth experienced at the top did not trickle down to the general population. Even with these 
economic reforms, Kenya consistently had a Gini coefficient of above 0.5 and most of the time 
even 0.6. This means that the top 20 percent of the population earned more than 50 per cent of 
the income. On the other hand, the bottom 20 per cent of the population earned less than 2 per 
cent of the total income. As a result, even though there was economic growth, the welfare of 
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the poor barely improved and Kenyan society remained highly unequal.186 This contributed to 
rising instability. Combined with skyrocketing unemployment and enough idle youth ready to 
struggle for change, an explosive cocktail was created.187 
 
4.4. Conclusion 
This chapter has explained the dynamics of the 2007 post-election violence in Kenya. The 
background to the election process of 2007 has been explained, as well as the problems that 
arose during the tallying of the votes. After Kibaki declared himself president after an obvious 
fraudulent election, violence broke out. This chapter has differentiated between three different 
types of violence to present the full dimensions of the conflict. After this, a number of causes 
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5. Mediation in the 2007-2008 post-election violence 
The objective of this chapter is to first give a short overview of the mediation process in 2007-
2008 post-electoral violence to explain the actors involved, how the process was initiated, what 
the main points of the peace talks were and how an agreement was reached. After this, the five 
variables as developed by Alexandre Raffoul regarding mediation, namely the use of leverage, 
horizontal inclusivity, relationship-building, vertical inclusivity and the content of the 
agreement, will be applied to the mediation process in Kenya to thoroughly analyze the process. 
 
As soon as violence in Kenya erupted, numerous actors stepped up in an attempt to reason with 
the two party leaders, Odinga and Kibaki, to accept a mediation process. Both leaders were 
caught in a zero-sum mentality, as Kibaki denied the existence of a crisis and Odinga ruled out 
a power sharing construction “with a dishonest person”. However, after Desmond Tutu flew 
down to Kenya and tried to persuade both parties to accept international mediation, the ODM 
agreed. Kibaki was nonetheless still very opposed.188 After that, President Museveni attempted 
to mediate between the parties, but he was rejected by Odinga, as he was known as Kibaki’s 
long-term ally. Coinciding with these attempts were frantic efforts by Western countries to set 
up an African-led mediation, pressuring the then chairman of the AU, President Kufuor of 
Ghana, to intervene. On the second of January 2008 the African Union sent out a message 
condemning the violence and calling for a compromise between the leaders. President Kufuor 
then went on a three-day shuttle diplomacy to Kenya and eventually managed to extract a 
promise from both parties to break the political impasse, even though both parties refused to 
be in the same room together.189  Using targeted sanctions, mainly travel bans for government 
officials, the international community finally managed to get both sides to finally agree to an 
AU-led mediation under the auspices of Kofi Annan.190  
 
The mediation process, which started on the 22nd of Janury 2008, three weeks after the 
beginning of violence, was led by the AUs Panel of Eminent Personalities that existed out of 
Kofi Annan as Chairperson, former Tanzanian President Benjamin Mkapa and Graça Machel 
from Mozambique.191 The Panel was tasked with assisting the parties to the conflict to make 
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sure that an escalation of the conflict was prevented and that sustainable peace was re-
established as soon as possible. The mediation was mandated by the AU and had the technical 
support of the UN, as well as worldwide diplomatic backing.192 Although Annan had expected 
to arrive in Nairobi a week earlier, an illness delayed him for a week as he needed to be 
hospitalized.193 During his time in the hospital, Annan mobilized international support for the 
mediation from organizations such as the AU, the EU, the UN, and countries such as the US, 
as well as the assurance that this mediation would be the only one.194 
 
The Panel arrived in Kenya on the 22nd of January, after which the Panel immediately had 
separate meetings with both Kibaki and Odinga. Two days later, on the 24th of January, Annan 
managed to bring the two leaders together in a closed meeting, after which Odinga and Kibaki 
shook hands publicly for the first time since the onset of the crisis and promised to engage in 
dialogue. However, each step forward was accompanied by conflicting dynamics and 
tensions.195 Therefore, on the 1st of February, Annan created a roadmap to the mediation in 
close consultation with the parties consisting of four core components. Agenda One aimed at 
bringing an immediate stop to the violence and restore human rights; Agenda Two intended to 
address the humanitarian crisis and to promote reconciliation; Agenda Three focused on 
solving the political crisis and Agenda Four aimed at developing long-term strategies for 
durable peace. The parties agreed that the first three items would be settled in seven to fifteen 
days from the start of the mediation, whereas the fourth would be given a one-year timeline. 
The parties also agreed to refer to the mediation as the Kenyan National Dialogue and 
Reconciliation (KNDR). 196 
 
The first two Agenda Items were relatively easy resolved. Agenda One was agreed upon on 
the same day, and Agenda Two was addressed on February 4th by the KNDR issuing statements 
that set out measures to address the items. These included for example advice to citizens to 
refrain from provocative statements, support to the Kenyan Red Cross for the return of IDPs 
and the promise of the establishment of a truth and justice commission.197 However, the 
atmosphere in the mediation room was less than constructive and when reaching the third point 
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on the Agenda, the negotiations reached an impasse. Neither of the parties was willing to 
compromise or accept a power sharing agreement, as Annan had suggested. Annan called in 
various experts to advise the parties on the technical options, but both parties kept on 
backtracking on previous commitments.198 To address the problems, Annan decided to hold a 
two-day retreat at an undisclosed location, but only after a kamukunji, an informal briefing of 
parliament, was held. The kamukunji created support for a possible power sharing coalition 
amongst parliamentarians. The retreat did not manage to create progress on Agenda Three, and 
upon arrival in Nairobi negotiations had reached a stalemate. However, after a talk with the 
then US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, after a suspension of talks, the parties went back 
to the drawing table and eventually agreed on a power sharing agreement on February 28th and 
signed the National Accord.199 
 
The National Accord was captured in the constitution on the 19th of March 2008. It made 
provisions for the establishment of the post of Prime Minister, which had nearly the same 
functions as the President. After this agreement was signed, Annan left Kenya, and a Nigerian 
diplomat, Oluyemi Adeniji, took over negotiations regarding Agenda Four. However, the 
parties considered that endorsing the National Accord signified the conclusion of negotiations. 
Subsequently, Adeniji only supervised working out the details that had already been discussed 
with Annan and nothing else was added to the agreement.200 
 
5.1. Use of leverage 
The international community feared that their long-term East African ally would plunge into 
civil war and possibly state collapse and took responsibility to avert the violence taking place.  
The community was unified like never before and spoke with one voice as it consolidated 
behind the AU. This certainly maximized the leverage the international community had over 
the mediation. Kofi Annan and his team served as a strong lead behind which the international 
actors could unite and support and pressure the process. In addition, Annan ensured that his 
mediation was the only one, so that the parties could not go window-shopping for a more 
favorable mediator. This consensus incentivized the mobilization of resources and support 
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from various corners, but also punitive measures.201 International pressure first and foremost 
aimed at bringing a halt to the violence. Donors reiterated on multiple occasions that it would 
not be “business as usual” in the financial assistance area until both parties reached a 
compromise. By mid-January, fifteen donor countries had alleged that they were reviewing 
financial aid to Kenya as long as hostilities continued. By the end of January some payments 
had been stopped. Also, on national levels various Kenyan groups and actors made an appeal 
to their leaders to bring an end to the violence.202 By early February, the two parties had agreed 
to the first two agenda items: hostilities should be stopped, and the process of reconciliation 
and humanitarianism should start. The third point on the agenda however, overcoming the 
political crisis, remained a problem. Annan and his team had suggested power sharing on 
multiple occasions, but this remained a problem for the parties. Therefore, the international 
community decided to increase the pressure on the leaders once again. President Bush of the 
US decided to cancel his scheduled visit to Kenya.203 US Secretary of State Rice had a serious 
conversation with the parties, making clear that it would not be “business as usual” between 
the US and Kenya if the parties could not reach an agreement.204 By early February, the US 
embassy informed 13 politicians and businessmen that their visa status was being reviewed 
concerning their relation to the violence, as did the British, the Canadians and the Swiss. The 
UK government also mentioned the possibility of assets being frozen of those who decided to 
sabotage the mediation process.205 The former and current presidents of Tanzania argued 
strongly for accepting a government that had both a President and a strong Prime Minister. 
Finally, on February 28th, the parties accepted a power sharing agreement.206 
 
The crisis in Kenya in 2007 was not easily mediated. It took pressure from all sides and a 
variety of influential nations and heads of states and political figures to pressure both Odinga 
and Kibaki into an agreement. Especially Kibaki was unwilling to participate in an international 
mediation, as he claimed he was the rightfully elected President. As Odinga was the one with 
more to gain from a mediation, he was quick to support. However, both parties heavily resisted 
the idea of a power sharing agreement, a suggestion made by the mediation team. It took heavy 
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pressure from all sides and a considerable amount of punitive measures before both ODM and 
PNU accepted a power sharing structure. After all, the consequences of not accepting a power 
sharing agreement would have been considerable. Therefore, the agreement was signed as a 
result of extensive third-party pressure. 
 
5.2. Horizontal inclusivity 
When violence started in Kenya, Kenya’s civil society was crucial in constructing an 
environment that favoured mediation. The media informed the public accurately, but most 
notably stepped up against the government when it produced a ban on live broadcast, giving 
the government 24 hours to lift the ban and defying the ban when the government refused. In 
addition, a group of well-known Kenyans, the Concerned Citizens for Peace, first attempted to 
convince the parties to participate in a locally driven mediation process.207 This was however 
rejected by the fighting parties. Significantly absent were the religious organizations, which 
had historically been very involved in Kenya’s struggles for independence and democracy. 
Nonetheless, in 2007 religious networks were facing failing religious leadership. Both the 
Christian and Muslim sides were split along ethnic lines and differences in opinion regarding 
the solution of the crisis.208 However, the National Council of Churches of Kenya did actually 
approach the mediation team to pledge for a negotiated solution, thereby also urging Odinga 
and Kibaki to participate in personal talks.209 
 
When the process of international mediation started, it became evident that the only parties 
present at the negotiation table were to be the ODM and the PNU. Even though Annan 
consulted closely with various civil society groups, none were involved in the actual 
negotiations. However, the Kenyan civil society groups were key supporters of the AU-led 
mediation and they contributed considerably to attaining a settlement. The private sector, 
including major trade unions and manufacturing associations, shocked by the decline in 
economic activity, lobbied for a settlement. Other civil society organizations, Kenyan 
academics and human rights advocates presented critical analyses and proposals to the Panel.210 
Their submissions and meetings with the Panel contextualized the crisis and assisted in 
developing suitable corrective steps. Civil society advised the Panel on its agenda items, 
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besides regional experts. Often, they had developed their suggestions and recommendations 
alongside the private sector and religious communities, which added to the legitimacy of the 
suggestions. In addition, civil society also lobbied extensively for a political settlement and an 
end to violence. They monitored the election violence and analysed the patterns of violence. 
They started regional community talks in order to bring people back together by creating spaces 
in which domestic negotiators started to “break the ice” between opponents. Therefore, Kenyan 
civil society was closely involved in the mediation process, however not at the negotiation 
table.211  
 
Horizontal inclusivity can be regarded as including those to the mediation table that have the 
ability to either implement or spoil peace. Given the fact that the 2007 crisis essentially evolved 
around the two political parties the ODM and the PNU, it seems obvious that it was these two 
parties that were involved in the mediation. Kenyan political parties are comprised of political 
and economic elites. Political parties do not have distinct political programs but rather 
campaign on the basis of ethnic alliances, which are subject to change at any given time. As 
election times are the most important and decisive political times in Kenya, all elites were most 
definitely present on the political stage to defend their privileges. This approach to politics 
indicates that the political elites were all involved in either the ODM or the PNU at the time of 
the peace negotiations. In addition, Annan involved all parliamentarians during the informal 
kamukunji sessions. Therefore, it is safe to say that horizontal inclusivity in the mediation 
process was attained on the elite-level. However, when it comes to civil society, some side 
notes remain. Even though the Panel closely consulted with civil society groups at various 
stages during the mediation process, civil society did not have a say in the mediation. As civil 
society has a powerful role in implementing peace, it could have been constructive to the peace 
negotiations to have civic leaders present, also because the political actors got stuck in 
deadlocks multiple times. This would have contributed to feelings of local ownership. 
However, it needs to be noted that by adding more people to the table, negotiations would also 
have become more complex. Nonetheless, civil society has access to a large part of the 
population on grassroot level, a position through which a major challenge of the crisis could 
be tackled. Therefore, it would have contributed to inclusivity when representatives of civil 
society were present in the mediation. 
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5.3. Relationship Building 
Annan faced the difficult task bringing two leaders with zero-sum mentalities together. In 
addition to their own reservations, both the ODM and the PNU had numerous hardliners in 
their parties that were unwilling to compromise on anything. For the PNU, this translated into 
the claim that Kibaki truthfully won the elections and as such had the right to the presidency. 
The ODM insisted the elections were rigged and therefore Kibaki’s government was 
illegitimate and called for a re-election. When Annan arrived in Kenya on Janury 24th, he 
realized tensions were very high and mistrust was deep. He asked the parties to each name 
three representatives to start the dialogue, as direct conversation between Kibaki and Odinga 
would most likely lead to confrontation. The two protagonists eventually joined the official 
negotiations on 29th January.212 This is in line with trust-building practices providing a non-
committal beginning when the parties are not ready to enter official peace negotiations. This 
type of beginning gives the parties time to offer increasingly greater degrees of reassurance 
and encouragement, until they are ready to enter the official negotiations.213 
 
The first two Agenda Items focused on brining and end to the violence and to start the process 
of reconciliation. Item number three was aimed at a political solution and item number four 
addressed long-term issues and solutions. The mediation team sought to build trust and to 
create a peaceful environment by first concentrating on short-term issues. Annan hoped to get 
off to a swift and positive start which would create a constructive enough environment to 
address the thornier issues.214 This appeared to work as the mediation started out smoothly and 
both parties quickly issued statements in early February calling for an end to the violence. 
However, once the mediating team reached agenda point three it became apparent that both 
parties were still deeply distrustful of one another and unwilling to compromise. The Panel 
took the parties through a list of their political options and emphasized the benefits of a political 
settlement. However, neither party was willing to compromise, and the mediation reached a 
deadlock.215 Annan approached the deadlock by exerting more pressure on the parties. He did 
so by inviting political experts to provide technical clarifications on the negotiations, informing 
the Kenyan population of the progress that had been made thereby increasing the pressure on 
the parties, and by inviting both parties on a two-day retreat to Tsavo National Park. Annan 
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also requested to brief parliament on the progress in an informal session, the kamukunji, before 
leaving for Tsavo. In combination with international pressure on Kenya’s political elite as 
mentioned before, and a temporary suspension of the talks due to the unproductive nature of 
the negotiations, the parties finally agreed on a power sharing arrangement with the positions 
of Prime Minister and President on the 28th of February.216 Annan left the country after 41 days 
of negotiations, appointing Nigerian diplomat Oluyemi Adeniji to lead the last round of 
negotiations as agenda item four was not yet discussed. However, this change in mediator 
brought challenges to the process, as many members of the negotiations did not take these last 
negotiations seriously. Most members believed the signing of the National Accord was the end 
of the negotiations and were passive in approaching this last agenda point, which required legal 
and constitutional action. As a result, Adeniji only managed to get details worked out of what 
had already been agreed on under Annan.217 
 
Annan genuinely tried to build trust between parties considering the way he started off by 
allowing both parties to appoint representatives to start discussions in a subtle way. He also 
aimed to construct a conducive working environment by first concentrating on short-term 
issues before moving onto the riskier problem of political settlement. However, his approach 
showed shortcomings as soon as the mediation became harder and more to the point. Although 
the mediation team attempted to re-establish the peace by organizing a retreat to Tsavo, it was 
not successful. It was only in combination with exerting excessive pressure on the parties and 
rushing the process that an agreement was reached. Therefore, there was not enough time to 
create a working relationship between Kibaki and Odinga. When Annan then left before an 
agreement on agenda point four was achieved, the negotiating parties gave up on making an 
effort to compromise. Sadly, it was exactly the fourth agenda point that could have prevented 
violence in future elections. As a result, the mediation did not foster as much trust- and 
relationship building as it could have done. 
 
5.4. Vertical Inclusivity 
The general Kenyan population was very supportive of the mediation effort. The mediation 
team commenced a wide consultative process with multiple constituencies in Kenya to promote 
public dialogue and to build trust in the peace talks. Before commencing the talks, Annan met 
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with different leaders from religious, business and human rights groups for multiple days to 
get a feeling for what was happening on the ground. On 26 January, when the parties were still 
not talking directly to each other but through intermediaries, the Panel visited the Rift Valley, 
where violence was still raging.218 They came face-to-face with the scale and the implications 
of the violence and the destruction of lives. They talked to victims and witnessed how violence 
was impacting families and communities. Upon their return to Nairobi, they conducted a press 
conference in which they made an appeal to Kenyans to stop the violence.219 
 
From the start, the Panel attempted to embrace a transparent communication strategy towards 
the general public that was developed to build confidence in the peace negotiations. It entailed 
regular meetings with domestic organizations and a website was created where all the 
agreements and press statement of the mediation were published. As the process was extremely 
fragile and fear was ominous amongst the general population, media communication was used 
to involve the people on the ground but also to keep pressure on the negotiation team. 
Whenever the parties reached an agreement and the agreements were signed, they were made 
public immediately. This was done to keep the talks moving forward and reducing the risk that 
some decisions might be reviewed. In addition, it reassured the Kenyan population that the 
process was moving forward. However, what was not shared with the general population was 
the constant stalling, the bickering over technicalities, and the revisiting of topics in an attempt 
to shield the population from negative associations with the mediation process itself. To reach 
more people, Tanzanian President Mkapa translated all press conferences into Swahili.220 
However, even though the public was informed of the agreements made during the mediation, 
the mediation was mainly focused on elite discussions. Arguably the most important goal of 
the mediation was bringing an end to the violence, which obviously concerned the population. 
Nonetheless, the mediation was centered around questions of governance and power-sharing, 
rather than involving itself with assessing root causes of the violence and possible solutions. 
As such, the mediation rotated around the disputes between the two contending political sides 
instead of accounting for the normal citizens’ concerns.221 
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Although the mediation team genuinely worked hard to involve Kenya’s general population by 
giving very regular media updates, the mediation was in essence an elite talk. During the 
mediation, issues were discussed that regarded the political elites, the most striking one being 
Agenda Three. Even though the general population was regularly updated through the media 
and benefitted from President’s Mkapa Kiswahili translations, little was done by the parties to 
ensure that the concerns of the general population were addressed. Civil society groups updated 
the Panel regularly, but were not allowed to sit at the table, as it was reserved for the culprits. 
As a result, very little was done to support the general populations. Although addressing root 
causes was on the mediation agenda, it was only discussed after the Accord was already signed 
and Annan had left the mediation, which contributed to a feeling amongst the parties that root 
causes were not important. 
 
5.5. Content of the agreement 
Kenya’s Dialogue and Reconciliation process finally reached an agreement on the four agenda 
points on February 28th when Kibaki and Odinga signed the Agreement on the Principles of 
Partnership of the Coalition Government. The agreement, later called the National Accord and 
Reconciliation Act, formulates the function of Prime Minister responsible for coordinating and 
managing the delivery of the functions and affairs of government. It also notes that both parties 
are to nominate a Deputy Prime Minister. The coalition government was to reflect the relative 
parliamentary strength of both parties and observe portfolio balance. The coalition government 
can be terminated if one of the parties withdraws, if both of the parties agree to it in writing or 
if Parliament dissolved. It also noted that the Prime Minister and his deputies could only be 
expelled from office after a no-confidence vote in parliament.222 The National Accord was 
captured in the Constitution on March 19th after consistent pressure from Odinga and on April 
13th, after an incredibly painful process, Kibaki appointed a 42-member Cabinet that vowed to 
initiate processes of reconciliation.223 In addition to the National Accord, the parties signed 
four agreements into existence that started the procedure of examining long-term grievances. 
The parties agreed to the establishment an Independent Review Commission to analyze the 
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electoral process; a Commission on Inquiry on Post-Election Violence; a Constitutional 
Review Commission and a Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission.224 
 
Even though the Accord was drawn up with the best intention of stopping the violence and 
moving Kenya forward politically, its contents were remarkably vague. Besides the notion that 
the position of Prime Minister was to be created, there was very little clarity on how the parties 
were to work together or implement reforms.225 This has caused considerable difficulties in 
implementing the Accord and at some points even gave rise to violence again. One of the main 
initial challenges of the Accord was appointing a cabinet. The Accord required that cabinet 
should reflect the parliamentary strengths of both parties. Practically, this meant that cabinet 
positions had to be shared 50/50 between the PNU and the ODM. However, it was unclear how 
this balance throughout the government was to be achieved, as the Accord did not mention the 
size of cabinet or the number of ministers and their classifications. So, appointing a cabinet 
together was the first challenge Odinga and Kibaki faced. The agreement also did not define 
how functions would be distributed across ministries and how employee requirements were to 
be met. Tensions in the country were rising in the country as a result of intense quarrelling 
between the parties, who seemed to not be able to reach an agreement and were stuck in yet 
another stalemate. However, after 6 weeks the parties finally reached an agreement and 
appointed a 42-member cabinet.226 In addition, there was an immense risk that one of the parties 
would withdraw from the agreement. The ambiguity of the agreement coupled with differing 
PNU and ODM interpretations of the Accord contributed to the fragility of the agreement. 
Indeed, the agreement specified parties can withdraw from the agreement but did not specify 
what would happen in such an occasion. If the PNU would withdraw from the agreement, 
Kibaki would still hold his position as President and the PNU would have all cabinet positions. 
If the ODM withdrew however, it would mean abandoning the position of Prime Minister and 
cabinet positions. Both parties could stall elections in the case of withdrawing. The unclarity 
of the agreement contributed greatly to the problems of creating a coalition government.227 
However, the parties did have a clear ‘to-do’ list when it came to reforms that addressed the 
root causes. The agreement had a number of steps incorporated that were aimed at solving 
some of the fundamental issues in society, such as land tenure concerns and confronting human 
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rights abuses. However, none of these issues were discussed in the initial mediation which 
contributes to a more complicated implementation phase. To truly address the underlying 
factors of the crisis, the agreement should have been stronger and more detailed on the 
cooperation and collaboration of the two parties.  
 
5.6. Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the mediation process in Kenya by first elaborating on the 
circumstances the mediation came about and how the mediation was structured. Moreover, the 
mandate of Annan and his team was noted, and the general process of the mediation was 
described. After this, the five variables as developed by Alexandre Raffoul were introduced 
and the mediation was discussed according to each variable. Leverage was used considerably 
by both the mediation team and the international community. It was made very clear to both 
Odinga and Kibaki that a continuance of the violence would not be tolerated and as long as the 
situation in the country was dire, there would not be ‘business as usual’. Annan tried his best 
to make the mediation as inclusive as he could, both vertically and horizontally, but there were 
still some improvements to make; for example, civil society could have been included at the 
negotiation table. A specific approach to improve trust-building during the mediation was 
adopted by for example introducing the retreat to improve the relationship between the parties. 
However, since time was limited and the number of issues extensive, the mediation did not 
completely manage to build a working relationship between Kibaki and Odinga. Lastly, the 
agreement itself was fairly vague and did not make proper provisions in case either of the 
parties would want to withdraw. In summary, the mediation managed to bring an end to 
violence, as was its aim, but some items could have been approached differently. 
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6. Power Sharing: Kenya’s Grand Coalition  
This chapter concentrates on the power sharing period in Kenya after the peace agreement. 
Following a short introduction of the coalition government in Kenya, the chapter continues by 
applying the five variables developed by Alexandre Raffoul on power sharing, as explained in 
the theoretical framework, to the Kenyan case. The power sharing in Kenya lasted from 2008 
to 2013. Therefore, this analysis will span that timeframe. 
 
The National Accord prescribed an equal division of government between the PNU and the 
ODM. As a result, the cabinet was increased with nine new ministries and enough positions to 
accommodate all the parties in the coalition, totalling up to 94 ministers who all earned over 
$15,000 a month. This culminated in Kenya’s “largest, most fragmented, ill-coordinated, 
incoherent and expensive cabinet in Kenya’s history”.228 Like most power sharing agreements, 
by bringing an end to violence quickly and to create space for political change, the Accord 
entrenched the key culprits of violence in the highest levels of the state. Indeed, a power sharing 
agreement was accepted as it lured the opponents in through the notion of shared access to state 
resources. In addition, since both sides included people guilty of corruption and violence, 
Kenya’s grand coalition had every incentive to maintain the status-quo of impunity.229 Under 
multipartyism, Kenyan politics has been defined by cycles of elite cooperation, as elites sought 
alliances to win elections, and fragmentation, as these alliances rapidly collapsed after the polls. 
As a result of these “elite musical chairs”, few political figures have not at some point or 
another worked as colleagues. This means that important political figures were not tied to a 
political party but are rather spread throughout the system. This is important to understand 
power sharing in Kenya, as we do not only look at the two parties, but also at individual 
political actors.230  
 
6.1. Balance of power 
Shortly after the establishment of cabinet, continuous bickering between the PNU and the 
ODM defined the Kenyan political sphere. The institutionalization of conflict led to numerous 
deadlocks and continuous fighting within the new cabinet.231 Ministers constantly quarrelled 
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over pay, seniority, and over who gets the best rooms or the best seating position during 
government gatherings.232 Even the two party leaders were not above these quarrels; Kibaki 
once derailed a meeting when he was not able to sit in his usual chair and Odinga refused to 
attend gatherings if there was no red carpet laid out for him. In April 2009 and again in 2010, 
boycotts hindered the implementation of the Accord. In 2009, the ODM boycotted all meetings 
with the PNU when they could not agree on an agenda for a planned retreat to Kilanguni. The 
impasse was only broken when the Permanent Committee on Management of the Grand 
Coalition reached a tentative agreement on important issues. In 2010, the ODM once launched 
a boycott when Kibaki overruled Odinga’s decision to suspend two ministers suspected of 
corruption.233 However, there was no particular change in the balance of power between the 
two parties. Neither party decided to leave the coalition to challenge the agreement or to pursue 
more power. Rather, Kenya almost changed back to a one-party state with a cabinet in which 
each actor was motivated by personal greed; as such, the focus laid more on individual 
politicians and alliances than political parties. 
 
Despite the continuous bickering, political relations between the parties seemed to improve in 
2010. In 2010, in a wave of political advancement, the grand coalition proposed a new 
constitution.234 Constitutional reform had been on Kenya’s political agenda for decades; 
however, it had always been blocked by the ruling political elite, afraid that their privileges 
and positions would be taken away from them. After the PEV in 2007, the National Accord 
made provisions for the creation of a new constitution within a year after the signing of the 
agreement to prevent more waves of violence and to start addressing root causes.235 
Nonetheless, the establishment of a new constitution was actively opposed by the government 
for years after the signing of the National Accord. For instance, the bodies that were crucial to 
the constitutional reform process, such as the IIEC and the IIBRC236, were only sworn in well 
into 2009. In addition, the funding that was supposed to be available to the bodies upon 
swearing in was heavily delayed. Furthermore, the government did not allocate any funds for 
a national referendum in 2009, which was necessary to get the popular approval of the new 
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constitution.237 Therefore it was not until 2010 that a new constitution was proposed. However, 
when it was finally approved, it was supported in a popular referendum by 68.55% and by the 
majority of government, with the notable exception of William Ruto.238  
 
During the phase that followed the signing of the National Accord, the differences between 
PNU and ODM caused continuous fighting between the two parties. However, with the 
creation of the grand coalition, Kenya effectively became a one-party state again as there was 
barely room for an opposition. Rather, the two parties ensured that all their crucial political 
figures were included in the cabinet, thereby creating the biggest and most expensive cabinet 
in Kenyan history. Each post was filled by an employee from both the PNU and the ODM. As 
a result, there was no clear dichotomy between the two parties, but rather between political 
figures, such as Kibaki and Odinga. Therefore, no one side was stronger than the other as no 
side was truly unified. Politicians were not only representing one of the parties, but also their 
personal interests. For that reason, balance of power problems did only consist of constant 
quarrels within government, but no renegotiation of terms was requested as both parties were 
equally strong even though considerable leverage was used during the mediation. After the 
mediation there was little to no outside pressure to find political compromise, although external 
forces did call for a power sharing agreement during the mediation phase. Due to this lack of 
external influence, Kenyan leaders were free to quarrel as they wished and political 
compromise was far to be seen. Nonetheless, after 2010, negotiations between parties even 
appeared to have improved and a new constitution was created.  
 
6.2. Outside spoilers 
After the agreement was signed, violence in Kenya virtually disappeared. By May 2009, the 
KNDR monitoring project confirmed that political violence had generally stopped and that the 
areas that had experienced the most violence were calm.239 Over the five years that the coalition 
was in power, the situation stabilized further. The Global Peace Index, which indicates more 
peaceful countries with lower scores, stated that Kenya improved from 133 in 2008 to 118 in 
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2013.240 Besides Al-Shabaab activity, violence in Kenya significantly decreased. In addition, 
Michael Chege, lecturer at the University of Nairobi, noted that economic growth also signifies 
further stabilization. In 2008, as the country was engulfed by violence, GDP slowed down to a 
growth of only 0.2%. However, in the years from 2009 to 2013, Kenya saw an average GDP 
growth of 5.6%.241 
 
The main perpetrators of violence, the gangs and militias, quickly disappeared into the cover 
of the general population again. Kenya has a long history of armed groups, that have emerged 
in the response to an anticipated threat against the community and against an increasing 
fragility of the state. These groups are organised by a number of stakeholders, including the 
regime in power.242 During the 2007 elections, various gangs organized along ethnic lines, such 
as the Mungiki and Taliban militia groups, organized attacks against civilians and posed 
themselves as protectors of their respective ethnic communities. There are numerous sources 
that indicate a link between these militias and the state, as the militias sometimes operate by 
order of state officials. The government utilizes the gangs every now and then to execute extra-
judicial services, specifically during election times. This ambiguous relationship between the 
states and the militias makes it incredibly hard to dismantle the armed groups. The very 
existence of the groups poses a threat to security.243 After the 2007 crisis, the government 
cracked down hard on known gang members to regain control over the use of violence. Police 
“death squads” were reported to have engaged in summary executions of suspected Mungiki 
members.  The UN Special Rapporteur stated that police murdered with impunity and under 
the orders of senior officers. As a result, gang members have disappeared back in the protective 
layers of their respective communities and no longer threatened peace.244 
 
The mediation by Kofi Annan enjoyed mass support from the Kenyan population and the 
international community. These pressures from below and above eventually managed to 
convince both parties to sign the agreement and to engage in a power sharing agreement.245 As 
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discussed previously, the major parties to the conflict were included in the mediation. The only 
significant party that was not invited to the negotiation table was civil society. Nonetheless, 
civil society was involved in advising the Panel and showed considerable support for the 
negotiations. Although during the power sharing period, civil society was heavily involved on 
the grassroot level to promote peace and reconciliation, the organizations were not likely to 
‘spoil’ the peace. Therefore, even though they were excluded during the mediation, they were 
not a threat to peace. The main perpetrators of violence were militias that emerged out of a 
necessity to protect their communities, but slowly evolved towards opportunistic gangs. The 
Kenyan government has historically struggled in dealing with this gangs, mainly because they 
are known for having ties to high-ranking politicians. However, after the 2007 crisis the 
government cracked down hard on known militia members, by for example ordering extra-
judicial killings. Although this process was unconstitutional, it contributed to the absence of 
outside spoilers during the power sharing period. As a result of these processes, Kenya’s peace 
agreement did not experience any outside spoilers. 
 
6.3. Inside spoilers 
The ODM and the PNU signed the National Accord after being heavily pressurized by the 
international community to come to an agreement and to bring an end to the violence. As the 
report from Human Rights Watch pointed out, Kibaki only agreed to a mediation and a power 
sharing settlement after international actors had done everything possible to pressure Kibaki 
into a compromise. Before that, the Kibaki administration appeared undisturbed by the violence 
that followed the December elections, claiming that he was the rightful winner.246 After an 
agreement was made, it became the responsibility of Kenyan politicians to implement the 
agreement and protect the safety of Kenya’s citizens. They also had the responsibility to ensure 
that their written commitment to end impunity and to create long-term reforms became a 
reality.247 However, it soon became apparent that Kenya’s government had very limited 
commitment to the agreement. Politicians displayed little willingness to implement new 
measures and did everything in their power to delay reforms. 
 
The practice of power sharing created opportunities for the establishment of new alliances, as 
MPs explored possibilities to exploit the system for their personal gain, while at the same time 
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shielding themselves and their allies from prosecution. Tendi and Cheeseman refer to this as 
“the politics of collusion”, as political enemies quickly found common ground by dedicating 
their energy to optimizing their own conditions of service.248 Indeed, the fact that Kenya’s 
kleptocratic ruling elite was expected to spearhead the process of reforms brought a range of 
problems with it. Very few substantive reforms have been realized as Kenya’s struggle for 
reforms has been characterized by opportunism; as soon as actors achieve their objectives, for 
example being elected, resistance against reforms commences.249 The establishment of a 
government of unity has created new opportunities for anti-reform actors to cooperate. It is 
through this subtle process that reforms and political change have been continuously 
undermined from inside out.250  
 
The National Accord aimed at improving transparency and political accountability, however, 
performance was poor. During the governing period of the coalition government from 2008 to 
2013, Kenya experienced multiple corruption scandals that implicated ministers from both 
sides of the coalition.251 As a result, the final monitoring report of the implementation of the 
Accord harshly stated there were no substantial accomplishments in the fight against 
impunity.252 At certain times, corruption threatened to directly derail cabinet and the reality of 
power sharing. For example, as early as June 2008, the finance minister was sacked because of 
a US$ 60 million scandal that involved the Grand Regency Hotel in Nairobi, which was also 
connected to the Goldenberg scandal under Moi. This was followed in 2009, when corruption 
threatened to derail the management of government when two top aides to Odinga, Permanent 
Secretary Mohammed Isahakia and Chief of Staff Caroli Omondi were implicated in a US$ 
150.000 million maize scandal. However, both were reinstated four months later by Kibaki 
after an anticorruption commission cleared their names. In October 2010, the minister of higher 
education was suspended by Kibaki because of fraud scam that involved US$ 1.2 million. Eight 
days later, the minister of foreign affairs resigned because of a US$ 250 million corruption 
scandal that involved land purchase.253 This demonstrates that political accountability was still 
a very distant objective. 
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The creation of a new constitution in 2010 was a milestone in the history of Kenya. However, 
even though the Cabinet in a period of cooperation produced a new constitution and 
campaigned in unity for its acceptance in a national referendum, it was still not fully 
implemented by 2013, despite the deadlines for implementation had been August 2011. By 
early June 2011, only three Bills had been passed into law, even though there were sixteen laws 
that had to be enacted.254 Parliament endorsed Acts conflicting with the ideology of the 
constitution.255 For example, MPs watered down the Leadership and Integrity Act in such a 
way that those involved in imminent criminal court cases could still hold elective posts; they 
also ensured that those seeking elective positions would not be vetted by the state, nor would 
they have to declare their wealth. The Commission for the Implementation of the Constitution 
(CIC) argued that “Parliament’s action of passing the Act in its current form is a deliberate 
attempt at sabotaging the enforcement of the strict ethical and moral requirements as contained 
in the Constitution” and filed a petition.256 However, the High Court dismissed the petition by 
claiming the dilution of the law was not unconstitutional.257 
 
Although Kenya’s peace accord promised a comprehensive plan for reforms and sustainable 
change, in reality, little has been achieved. One of the main reasons for this is that Kenya’s 
reforms were to be spearheaded by a corrupt elite, that had every incentive to continue the 
status quo. Subsequently, inside elements in the government have continuously attempted to 
derail the peace process by not sticking to the agreement, for example by watering down laws 
in order to protect themselves. As a result, reforms have been delayed or sometimes even 
actively opposed. Although some positive change has occurred, the majority of reforms have 
been lagging behind. Inside spoilers have emerged both as a means to undermine the other 
party, but also between individuals looking to enrich themselves. Annan tried to avoid spoilers 
by encouraging relationship-building, but the parties were not as susceptible has he hoped. 
Decades of mutual hostility and little trust prevailed the new contacts after the negotiations. 
This demonstrates that inside spoilers emerge due to a lack of trust in the other party, but also 
as a means of self-preservation. As such, the very nature of Kenyan politics adds an extra 
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dimension to Raffoul’s framework, as parties are not unified blocks, but rather consist of self-
interested individuals looking to circumvent agreements and the law for their own gain. 
6.4. Identity and political accountability  
The National Accord instructed the coalition to foster cohesion, national cohesion and 
reconciliation through high profile meetings in the affected areas. Three years after the 
initiation of this programs, data conducted by the KNRC monitoring project demonstrates that 
communities in those areas affected by violence have initiated multiple peace initiatives with 
the assistance of faith-based and community organizations.258 The government established the 
National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC), which organized a national civic 
education and advertising campaign that called for inter-community cohesion and peaceful 
elections. The NCIC, together with civil society and county governments, held various inter-
communal events and meetings across the nation and urged people to keep the peace and start 
a dialogue. In addition, the Catholic Church initiated a number of projects under the name of a 
‘connector projects’. These projects have attempted to link dialogue sessions with further 
reaching programs, such as deepening the socio-economic dependence between communities. 
This strengthens the bonds of self-interests between groups as interdependency grows. 
Furthermore, the connector projects have tried to create more job opportunities for youth, so 
that young men are substantially more difficult to engage in violence.259 These initiatives have 
assisted in rebuilding trust amongst communities. 
 
However, national politics continuously disrupting these efforts. As politics in Kenya has 
always been deeply ethnicity-based, politicians rely on political tribalism to mobilize voters 
and supporters. Politicians made political statements and insinuations that bolstered ethnic 
divisions, which hindered reconciliation processes.260 The first two years of the coalition 
government the cabinet remained fairly stable. However, as the 2013 elections drew closer, 
parliamentarians grew increasingly impatient as they intended to form different entities to 
mobilize voter support. Fractions began to appear in the ODM after a fallout between Odinga 
and William Ruto, pitting Odinga’s Luo community against Ruto’s Kalenjins. The PNU also 
started to experience difficulties in keeping the party together, as some politicians positioned 
themselves as candidates for the presidency in 2013. These fractions inevitably affected the 
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use of ‘tribal’ language by politicians and created unrest within different communities.261 In 
addition, the relocation of IDPs had taken an ethnic dimension, as concerns were raised that 
the IDPs in the refugee camps were there to steal land from the locals. Moreover, the 
government’s IDP resettlement program was rumored to favor certain ethnic groups, which 
undermined the process of reconciliation in the country.262  
 
What further exacerbated ethnic tensions was the government’s response to the final report of 
the Waki Commission (CIPEV), including the involvement of the ICC. The Waki commission 
had been created under the guidance of the AU Panel of Eminent African Personalities to 
examine the post-electoral violence in Kenya. After extensive investigation CIPEV concluded 
that even though violence appeared to be spontaneous in some cases, in other cases of violence 
it became evident that they were planned well ahead of time and coordinated. According to 
CIPEV, the Kenyan state had failed miserably in addressing the violence and as such was guilty 
in itself of gross human rights violations. CIPEV advised setting up a special tribunal with the 
ability to prosecute to deal with perpetrators of violence and to circumvent the culture of 
impunity that had always surrounded Kenyan elections since the introduction of multiparty 
elections. CIPEV also mentioned in its final report that if the Kenyan government failed to 
establish a special tribunal, it would pass the names of alleged perpetrators to the ICC.263 After 
Parliament failed twice in establishing the tribunal, Kofi Annan, head of the Panel of Eminent 
African Personalities at the time, passed the envelope with the names of the accused to the ICC. 
As a result, the ICC launched investigations into the post-electoral violence shortly after.264 
 
The CIPEV report implicated members of the ruling political elite; therefore, it was met with 
resistance in the political sphere. The prospect of facing prosecution by domestic or 
international tribunals created anti-reform factions with compelling incentives to establish 
mutual protection societies across party lines. This combination of motivation and opportunity 
explains the emergence of the very unlikely political alliance of former bitter rivals, Uhuru 
Kenyatta and William Ruto. As Kenyatta hails from the Kikuyu community and Ruto 
represents the Kalenjins, which fought one another in some of the worst violence in 2008, they 
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were known to be bitter political rivals. However, out of fear that their names might feature in 
the secret envelope passed to the ICC, the two engaged in the formation of a new political 
alliance to deter the accusations. They were supported by the political community, as MPs 
refused to vote Ruto out of cabinet for alleged corruption charges. Therefore, impunity was 
still an everyday occurrence towards the end of the power sharing timeframe. 
 
Although the National Accord preached national cohesion and unity, during the five years that 
the power sharing cabinet was in power, little changed. Nonetheless, churches, community 
organizations, regional governments and the NCIC initiated a number of dialogue and 
education sessions to bring communities closer on a grassroots level. These initiatives seemed 
to be successful, however, national politics disrupted the processes, as politicians continued 
using ethnic language and divisive rhetoric. Moreover, impunity was not addressed as 
government officials acted out of self-preservation and had no incentives to change the status-
quo. As the mediation was mainly an elite-centered process that did not incorporate the general 
population’s concerns, it is not surprising that communities started to follow political hardliners 
once again, as they perceived that politicians from other communities threatened their security. 
As a result, no political accountability was demanded from below and a continuance of identity 
politics ruled the Kenyan political arena yet again during the 2013 elections.  
 
6.5. Credible commitment problems 
The main aim of the National Accord was to establish the necessary circumstances under which 
a unity government could initiate extensive reforms and address the fundamental issues 
underlying the conflict.265 Following the Accord, the parties agreed to realize several reforms, 
such as a long-anticipated constitutional review and parliamentary, judicial, police and civil 
service reforms. There were to be election reviews and detailed reviews of the crisis. The 
government also anticipated to make land reforms, and to fight poverty, inequality, youth 
unemployment and regional imbalances. The parties committed to improving national cohesion 
and unity. Lastly, they promised to promote transparency and accountability in the affairs of 
government while fighting impunity.266 All these issues were recognized as the fundamental 
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problems that causes the 2007 crisis in the country and that were thought to create new areas 
of conflict and contention in the future.267  
 
Although the National Accord provided a clear agenda and roadmap to resolving root causes 
underlying the 2007 election violence, the actual implementation of the agreement was 
problematic. Even though the Kenyan government took a huge step forward by creating a new 
constitution, other fundamental issues have been largely ignored. For example, the government 
introduced Operation Rudi Nyumbani (Operation Return Home) to resettle the thousands of 
displaced people shortly after the signing of the Accord. However, many IDPs could not return 
home as most of them had lost everything and refused to leave the refugee camps. The 
government then used physical force to remove the IDPs from the camps and claimed that the 
humanitarian issue was solved. Even in 2013, the year that new elections would take place, 
many were still looking for a place to call home, which was also related to land issues that were 
yet to be solved.268 Land has always been crucial to securing sustainable peace and stability in 
Kenya as identified by agenda item four. The National Accord made provisions for securing 
land reform within a year, however, the government dragged its feet. In September 2011, a 
number of non-governmental stakeholders pulled out of the process of preparing draft 
legislation, arguing that the ministry was not consulting adequately.269 The ministry did crate 
the Land Reforms Transformation Unit to implement reforms, however, many argue that the 
unit is weak, inefficient and not independent. As of 2012, the National Land Commission was 
yet to be established.270 Delays in land reforms have been attributed to corrupt politicians with 
vested interest in the sector, that are known for grabbing land. By hindering the initiating of 
reforms, they are protecting their own interests.271 Lastly, impunity remains a huge problem. 
From the signing of the Accord until the elections in 2013, few perpetrators have been held 
accountable. The government has not made any effort in pursuing justice for the victims, and 
most cases have been acquitted. In many cases, evidence has been tampered with to prevent 
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conviction. As the government protects her own, little steps have been made to eliminate 
impunity272. 
 
Ever since the signing of the Accord, Kenya’s politicians have showed repeatedly that they are 
not interested in committing to the agreement. The Accord was very ambiguous, which gave 
the government reasons to drag its feet, and made provisions to address root causes in the year 
to come. However, five years after the signing of the agreement very little has been achieved. 
Both the PNU and the ODM have shown credible commitment problems as neither party has 
demonstrated to be committed to changes. Besides the creation of a new constitution in 2010, 
as described in ‘the balance of power’, which was barely implemented in 2013, close to nothing 
that was agreed on in the Accord regarding solving fundamental issues had been achieved. 
High-ranking officials actively opposed the changes suggested in the agreement, most likely 
out of self-interest and self-preservation. While most tensions between the two parties settled 
down after 2010, tensions still simmered under the surface and high levels of cooperation 
enabled the re-emergence of patronage structures and systems which have collaborated to 
obstruct reform efforts. 
 
6.6. Conclusion 
This chapter has analyzed power sharing in Kenya according to the variables developed by 
Alexandre Raffoul. It has explained the different dynamics of power sharing from an elite 
perspective and in relation to the five variables regarding mediation. It has demonstrated that 
the power sharing period in Kenya was far from perfect, as little of the planned reforms were 
actually achieved. Kenya’s power sharing agreement suffered mostly from self-interested 
politicians that had little incentive to pursue reforms as it would endanger the status-quo. 
However, a new constitution was created, which was a huge step forward for Kenyan politics. 
Nonetheless, the power sharing period did little for political advancement in Kenya. 
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7. Conclusion 
In a context where mediation is increasingly employed as a means of conflict resolution, and 
power sharing agreements have progressively been proposed as a means to end violence and 
restore stability in countries wrecked by conflict, it is fundamentally important to review the 
type of these mediations and their propensity to affect post-agreement elite cooperation in the 
power sharing phase. This thesis has demonstrated that the design of a mediation does impact 
the performance power sharing agreements. By looking at five variables regarding power 
sharing and combining these with five variables that analyze mediation, it has established that 
specific features of the mediation process have an impact on the ability of elites to collaborate 
in the post-agreement phase. 
 
The use of leverage during the mediation is an important factor in influencing the success or 
failure of power sharing. When an agreement is accepted under intense external pressures, 
parties are less likely to commit to the agreement in the power sharing phase, as the agreement 
is less viable in the absence of continuous third-party pressure. In Kenya, both international as 
well as domestic actors put immense pressure on both parties to accept mediation and come to 
an agreement. The so-called sticks and carrots were introduced and eventually Kibaki and 
Odinga were pressurized into an agreement. This had consequences for elite negotiations after 
the signing of the National Accord, as parties did not feel obliged to cooperate and initially 
attempted to undermine each other. Eventually however, shared interests of self-preservation 
prevailed and from 2010, the coalition worked quite well together. 
 
The grade of horizontal inclusivity during the mediation can predict the emergence of outside 
spoilers after the power sharing settlement. When not all actors from the main parties are 
included in the peace negotiations, they might attempt to derail the peace process. Kenya’s 
peace talks were quite inclusive as the main political parties involved in the crisis were present 
at the negotiation table. The only influential faction not directly involved in the negotiations 
was civil society. However, civil society supported the mediation by providing advice to the 
Panel in numerous ways and updating the mediation team on events happening in the country. 
As a result, there were no outside spoilers that threatened to derail the negotiation process nor 
the power sharing settlement.  
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As the negotiations were understandably rushed to facilitate a quick end to violence, there was 
little time to create a working relationship between Odinga and Kibaki, who were bitter rivals. 
Although Annan attempted various relationship-building practices, such as the retreat in 
Kilaguni, the team was under extreme pressure to come to a solution quickly. Therefore, there 
was little time nor opportunity to build trust between the parties. As a result, implementation 
was hindered by numerous events of inside spoilers. MPs, aiming at the prevention of 
prosecution and self-preservation, voted for the watering down of a number of important bills. 
Although the National Accord promised to address root causes, little has been achieved due to 
continuous sabotage from within. 
 
To involve the general public in the negotiation process, Annan gave regular updates about the 
progress using local press. His team member Benjamin Mkapa assisted with Kiswahili 
translations to reach a wider public. A few conferences were held throughout the country 
through which people could give suggestions. However, in the end the mediation remained an 
elite business that addressed mainly the fears and grievances of those in power. Although 
NGOs, churches and local governments encouraged dialogue and cooperation, this was 
undermined by national politics. Politicians and high-ranking government officials continued 
to use hate-instigating speech and formed alliances along ethnic lines. In addition, impunity 
was not addressed, and little was done to improve political accountability. 
 
As Annan left shortly after Agenda Point 3 was reached during negotiations, both the PNU and 
the ODM felt like they had crossed the finish line and nothing more was agreed on regarding 
the tackling of root issues. In addition, the agreement was filled with ambiguities and unclear 
on various issues. As a result, credible commitment issues arose during the power sharing 
period. Promises were not kept, and government officials actively opposed reforms. Five years 
after the signing of the Accord, little was achieved besides the creation of a new constitution. 
 
This study concludes that the design of a mediation does influence the performance of power 
sharing, and that barriers to elite cooperation in the post-agreement period can be addressed in 
the mediation phase of conflict to prevent future tensions. However, Raffoul’s theory is not 
without faults. In the previous chapters, this thesis has shown that the existing political context 
in Kenya made the negotiations and the following power sharing period extremely difficult. 
The endemic elite corruption and patronage ruled and still rules Kenyan politics up to this day, 
thereby ensuring little change was embraced. No political agreement nor structure has 
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addressed this, as elites are the ones ruling these dimensions. This thesis is therefore a direct 
criticism of power sharing as a “one-size fits all” approach towards conflict and political crises. 
As cases like Kenya and Zimbabwe point out, power sharing is not necessarily the most 
sustainable manner to mediate the breakdown of political order. Is power sharing always the 
best solution to conflict and violence? Can mediation that was initiated primarily to end the 
violence then be steered to dealing with an entrenched political culture that would eventually 
derail the post-agreement implementation? As previous cases have shown in South Africa and 
Congo, continuous international involvement in the post-agreement phase contributes to the 
durability of the settlement. However, when the international community stopped investing in 
the implementation phase in Kenya, chaos and political impunity prevailed. This notion 
suggests that continuous third-party involvement is critical to the success of the implementation 
of power sharing agreements. 
 
This dissertation has contributed to the scholarly literature on power sharing in general and the 
Kenyan case in particular. By regarding mediation as an integral process to peacebuilding and 
to change mediation designs when applicable, conflict can be addressed in a more sustainable 
way that will bring long-term benefits. Mediation can be used effectively as a conflict 
management tool, but as a conflict resolution tool, international negotiations and third-party 
involvement should continue post-agreement as to create optimum reforms. As the Kenyan 
mediation took place within a political context of elite politics, patronage and corruption, 
political actors quickly reformed the power sharing agreement into a process that benefitted 
them. As a result, the reforms that were expected and hoped for by the general population, were 
not or barely implemented. 
 
This thesis is one of the first studies, besides Raffoul’s work, that researched the effects of 
mediation on the performance of a power sharing agreement. As this thesis has concluded that 
problems of power sharing are located in the mediation phase of conflict resolution, there is 
much more research to be done to further examine the link between mediation and power 
sharing, and specifically into mediation and power sharing in cases of political violence. It is 
important that more studies will be undertaken to determine the best practices in mediation to 
consolidate future agreements to advance to probability of success. Moreover, power sharing 
should only be regarded as a temporary transition process and should be mediated in a manner 
that strengthens political cooperation across all parties. Ultimately, power sharing should be 
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regarded as a continuous process in which assisted negotiations are included in the agreement 
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